Book Reviews by Harbaugh, William H et al.
Book Reviews
The Steel Seizure Reconsidered*
Truman and the Steel Seizure Case: The Limits of Presidential Power.
By Maeva Marcus. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. Pp.
xiv, 390. $14.95.
Reviewed by William H. Harbaught
For more than two decades Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer'
was regarded as sui generis or aberrant. Justice Black's holding that the
seizure violated the separation of powers was so simplistic and the con-
curring opinions so diffuse that there seemed little possibility that
Youngstown would become a landmark. In disgust, Edward Corwin
subtitled an article on the seizure "A Judicial Brick Without Straw."
Youngstown would be remembered, wrote Corwin, "as an outstanding
example of the sic volo, sic jubeo frame of mind into which the Court
is occasionally maneuvered by the public context of the case before it.".
Glendon Schubert predicted that the majority's evasion of the question
of the existence of a national emergency, coupled with its failure to
recognize a real conflict among statutory policies, would confine the
decision "to its very special facts." 3 Paul Freund, in a commentary that
seems to have fixed the law professoriate's view of the case, even sug-
gested that Youngstown never should have reached the Supreme Court
and that the Court should not have decided the validity of the seizure
in the posture in which the case did reach the Court.4
* The author wishes to thank the members of the Faculty Legal History Seminar at
the University of Virginia for their comments on an earlier version of this review.
t Commonwealth Professor of History, University of Virginia.
1. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
2. Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick Without Straw, 53 COLum. L. REv.
53, 64 (1953).
3. G. SCHUBERT, THE PRESIDENCY IN THE CouRTs 251, 326 (1957). See also Schubert, The
Steel Case: Presidential Responsibility and Judicial Irresponsibility, 6 W. POLITICAL Q. 61
(1953).
4. Freund, The Supreme Court, 1951 Term-Foreword: The Year of the Steel Case, 66
HARV. L. REv. 89, 89-95 (1952).
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Assuredly, the special interest in the separation of powers guaranteed
Youngstown a continuing hearing in political science circles. But the
interest was not, apparently, a strong one. Neglect of the case was even
more pronounced among law teachers, presumably because the logic of
Corwin, Freund, and others was too compelling and the professoriate's
interest in civil and individual rights too consuming. More inexpli-
cable, given the bent of historians for inclusiveness, was their disregard
of the entire episode. Eric Goldman's racy account of the post-war
decade fails to mention the seizure, and most twentieth-century text-
books contain not a single line on it.5
Now comes a fullscale historical study of the seizure and the flat as-
sertion by its author, Maeva Marcus, that Youngstown is "one of the
'great' constitutional law cases." It is a great case, she contends, because
it discussed the powers of the President at length and because it
"breathed new life into the proposition that the President, like every
other citizen, is 'under the law.' "I Nor is that quite the sum of her
brief. Youngstown, she suggests, spurred the Court to grapple with
basic constitutional questions in such politically charged cases as Brown
v. Board of Education,7 Baker v. Carrs and, most crucially, United
States v. Nixon.9 Those are bold contentions, no matter how guardedly
phrased. As Marcus realizes, their support rests not only on a demon-
stration of doctrinal linkage between Youngstown and later cases, but
also on a thorough comprehension of the seizure in all its dimensions-
political, economic, legal, and, not least, symbolic. She strives, accord-
ingly, to recreate the Steel Seizure case in its entirety; and in some 350
pages of text and notes that correct, modify, and augment previous ac-
counts, she fulfills her purpose in some, though by no means all,
respects.10
5. E. GOLDMAN, THE CRUCIAL DECADE (1956). Of fifteen 20th-century textbooks ex-
amined by this writer, only three mention the seizure. Yet many of these textbooks
describe, often with rare verve, Truman's ill-fated proposal to draft striking railroad
workers in 1946 and John F. Kennedy's temporarily successful rollback of steel prices in
1962.
The two pioneering accounts of the steel seizure episode were too brief to attract atten-
tion. See G. MCCONNELL, THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE OF 1952 (Inter-University Case Program
No. 52, 1960); A. WESTIN, THE ANATOMY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASE (1958).
6. M. MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITs OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER
228 (1977) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
9. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). See pp. 228-48.
10. Cf. IV. HARBAUGH, LAw YER's LAWYER 462-82 (1973) (previous account of seizure); G.
MCCONNELL, supra note 5 (same); A. WESTIN, supra note 5 (same). Marcus's description of
the events immediately preceding and following the strike omits three matters of general
import. First, average hourly earnings in steel were Sl.883 as compared to $1.987 in autos
and $2.232 in coal. Second, the industry refused for three months, until the eve of the
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Early in April 1952, Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer seized
the nation's steel industry on the order of President Truman. At the
time, negotiations to end the Korean War were deadlocked. Industry
leaders had rejected the Wage Stabilization Board's proposal for settle-
ment of a bitter labor dispute. And the United Steelworkers were
scheduled to walk out on April 9. The President and his advisers
feared that the slightest interruption of production would imperil the
defense effort." But instead of seeking a Taft-Hartley injunction or
invoking the seizure provisions of the Selective Service Act of 1948 or
the Defense Production Act of 1950,12 Truman acted on the basis of
what Department of Justice attorneys assured him were his "inherent"
constitutional powers.
Few presidential actions have generated more intense controversy
than Truman's seizure order. Fourteen separate resolutions to impeach
the President were introduced in Congress. Both the American Associa-
tion of Newspaper Publishers and the United States Chamber of Com-
merce censured Truman, and only one major newspaper defended him.
Senator Lyndon B. Johnson opined that the seizure showed a trend
toward dictatorship, and John W. Davis declared in one of the most
heartfelt oral arguments of his long career that the seizure was "a reas-
sertion of the kingly prerogative." Meanwhile, Truman botched a
thoughtful explanation of his decision by remarking that "a lot of
hooey" was being offered up.';
Yet there were no such blatant pronouncements about presidential
prerogatives, no such arrogant talk of selective compliance, as marked
Richard M. Nixon's conduct two decades later. On the contrary,
strike, to give its cost figures to the Office of Price Stabilization. Third, Clarence Randall,
spokesman for the industry, charged that the labor members of the Wage Stabilization
Board had been on labor's payroll when, in fact, they had been employed jointly by labor
and management as impartial arbiters.
11. In fact, the Truman administration's fears were probably unfounded. See p. 1280
infra.
12. Selective Service Act of 1948, § 18, 50 U.S.C. app. § 468 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (as
amended); Defense Production Act of 1950, § 201, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2081 (1952) (lapsed on
June 30, 1953). Truman and his advisers believed that the eighty-day "cooling off" period
of a Taft-Hartley injunction would be unfair to labor, because the union already had
voluntarily postponed the strike and because the Truman administration felt that the steel-
workers were entitled to some wage increase. Moreover, a strike of uncertain duration
would occur during the mandatory fact-finding by a board of inquiry required by the
Taft-Hartley Act. Although they never gave serious consideration to the condemnation
provisions of the Defense Production Act of 1950, they considered and rejected seizure
under § 18 of the Selective Service Act of 1948 because Department of Defense officials
insisted that this provision's procedures were much too time-consuming. See pp. 75-79.
13. See IV. HARBAUCH, supra note 10, at 469-70, 472; pp. 83-101. Although Marcus re-
ports that Truman had decided not to seek reelection, p. 36, she fails to report this fact in
chronological context or note that the date of the announcement was moved up because
of the tension generated by the steel crisis.
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Truman invited the Congress to supersede his order.14 Then, im-
mediately after the Supreme Court ruled against him, he directed
Sawyer to return the steel mills to their owners. Patently, Justice
Frankfurter captured the essence of Truman when he said in his con-
curring opinion that it was "absurd to see a dictator in a representative
product of the sturdy democratic traditions of the Mississippi Valley."'15
The popular view of Youngstown was that the Court "decided that
the President ... has no powers other than those named in the Con-
stitution or derived from acts of Congress." ' But a majority of the
Justices concluded no such thing. Only Justice Douglas accepted Black's
view that the lawmaking power was entrusted "to the Congress alone
in both good and bad times."' 17 Frankfurter deemed determination of
that question unnecessary. "Rigorous adherence to the narrow scope of
the judicial function," he wrote, "is especially demanded in contro-
versies that arouse appeals to the Constitution .... [These] questions
seem to exercise a mesmeric influence over the popular mind."'' 8 Justice
Burton accepted the concept of inherent powers by implication; or, as
Marcus phrases it, he "did not totally repudiate the doctrine."'19 And
Justice Clark affirmed it with extraordinary fervor: "The Constitution
does grant to the President extensive authority in times of grave and
imperative national emergency. . . . I care not whether one calls it
'residual,' 'inherent,' 'moral,' 'implied,' 'aggregate,' 'emergency,' or
otherwise." 20 Justice Jackson's long, complicated, and intellectually
subtle opinion could be read, and here is read by Marcus, both ways.
At several points Jackson explicitly rejected the inherent powers doc-
trine,2' yet he was unwilling to circumscribe the President's "lawful
role" as Commander-in-Chief when confronted by a foreign threat.
Suggesting that the question could only be settled by the "imperatives
of events," 22 he noted "the ease, expedition and safety with which
Congress can grant and has granted large emergency powers, certainly
ample to embrace this crisis."
2 3
14. In response to the steel industry's media attack on Truman's seizure order, Truman
sent a message to Congress immediately after the seizure stating his willingness to follow
any congressional directive. Marcus convincingly argues that Truman was merely trying to
forestall negative congressional action. Pp. 94-95.
15. 343 U.S. at 593-94.
16. TIME, June 9, 1952, at 17.
17. 343 U.S. at 633 (Douglas, J., concurring); see id. at 589.
18. Id. at 594.
19. P. 209; see 343 U.S. at 659.
20. 343 U.S. at 662.
21. Id. at 649-53.
22. Id. at 637, 645.
23. Id. at 653. Marcus is not the first to describe Justice Jackson's opinion as "am-
biguous." P. 216. See Corwin, supra note 2, at 63 ("Justice Jackson's rather desultory
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Although the author's account of the Steel Seizure case contains much
that is necessarily familiar, it is helpful to have the opinions and com-
mentaries both summarized and collated. Moreover, she has ferreted
out a number of new facts and set forth some controversial judgments
of her own. She reports that early drafts of Burton's opinion indicate
that he initially accepted the Government's contention that a strike
would imperil national security.2 4 She notes that Learned Hand told
Frankfurter that he would probably have upheld the seizure because
the Taft-Hartley Act's "implications do not extend to a condition of
war."' 25 She charges that Frankfurter acted "disingenuously" in em-
phasizing the House's defeat of a seizure amendment to the Taft-
Hartley bill in 1947 while neglecting the Senate's passage of a similar
provision in 1949.26 She speculates that the concern about the growth
of executive power expressed by several Justices, notably by Jackson,
was conditioned by their abhorrence of Nazism.2 7 And she asserts that
their resolve to rule on the merits was stiffened by Truman's decision
to take the nation into the Korean War without asking Congress for a
declaration of war.2 8 In the end, she agrees with Corwin that Clark
alone had come to the right conclusion for the right reasons: the
President was obligated to follow the procedures authorized by Con-
gress in the Selective Service Act, the Defense Production Act, or the
Taft-Hartley Act.
2 9
Clearly, the main strength of this book is its research in the tradi-
tional vein. The author's five years of research in private papers, her
exhaustive examination of governmental records, and her numerous
interviews have yielded a great many nuggets, both small and large. 30
opinion contains little that is of direct pertinence to the constitutional issue.") But see
Roche, Executive Powers and Domestic Emergency: The Quest for Prerogative, 5 W.
POLITICAL Q. 592, 615-16 (1952) (perceptive analysis of subtleties and nuances of Justice
Jackson's opinion).
24. In one draft Burton wrote, "I accept the Government's conclusion that [a strike]





29. P. 220; see Corwin, supra note 2, at 65.
30. These range from new information on the government's price proposals for the
industry to partial clarification of the administration's refusal to promise the lower courts
that it would maintain existing conditions of employment during the seizure. Pp. 121,
135; see especially p. 306 n.92. Marcus accurately points out that Secretary of Commerce
Sawyer's recollection that District Court Judge Pine asked Assistant Attorney General
Holmes Baldridge three times to promise that the government would not change the
conditions of employment during the seizure is incorrect. See C. SAWYER, CONCERNS OF A
CONSERVATIVE DEMOCRAT 261 (1968); cf. W. HARBAUGH, supra note 10, at 471 (incorrectly
follows Sawyer). The question was raised three times, but not so directly as Sawyer and
Harbaugh indicate. Sawyer and Harbaugh are also wrong in stating that Pine eventually
1276
Vol. 87: 1272, 1978
Steel Seizure
For present purposes, the most interesting of these is that the Supreme
Court knew before the ruling that the administration had greatly exag-
gerated the shortage of steel and that there was no imminent military
emergency31 "The Court [here read Frankfurter, Jackson, Burton, and
Clark]," concludes Marcus, "simply was not convinced that the crisis
confronting the nation was sufficiently grave to justify the President's
assertion of power. ' 32 Of comparable importance was the "clamor"
evoked by the charges and countercharges in the press and district
court. Ordinarily, the rhetorical excesses of principals and adjuncts are
of little moment. But as Marcus, following the lead of Corwin, persua-
sively argues, "the politics of the situation required a ruling on the
merits" if the Court was to retain respect as an institution. 33 This is
hardly to say that the outcome was inevitable. Idiosyncratic factors, not
inexorable forces, shaped proceedings in the district court; Judge Pine
could have enjoined changes in working conditions pending a factual
determination of irreparable harm. Once he ruled on the merits, how-
ever, public expectations compelled the Supreme Court to face the
constitutional issue also.
34
Marcus's surface description of all this is eminently sound. Yet it
lacks a sure appreciation of, and a proper emphasis on, the larger signif-
icance of the procedural irregularities in Judge Pine's court. That,
plainly, was the thrust of the Freund and Corwin commentaries; and
that, just as plainly, should be the focus of a historical account of this
phase of the case. But instead of developing this point in all its fullness,
the author provides a detailed narrative that misplaces responsibility
for the direction of the district court hearing and deadens the reader's
understanding of the intellectual richness of the true issue.
The key factor in Marcus's version of events in the district court was
was given this assurance. Surprisingly, Marcus fails to follow through on this finding in
regard to Judge Pine's lack of interest in the equitable, as opposed to constitutional, issues
in the case. See pp. 1278-81 infra.
Another interesting nugget is the reasonably firm finding that the issue that forced the
walkout and prompted the seizure was management's opposition to a union shop rather
than, as commonly believed, dissatisfaction with the Wage Stabilization Board's wage-price
proposals. Pp. 253-54. Cf. HousE CoaM. ON RULES, THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE, H.R. Doc. No.
534 (pt. 1), 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 225 (1952) [hereinafter cited as 1952 Doc.]. G. MCCONNELL,
supra note 5, at 21, 34 (strong hints of importance of union shop issue). This important
conclusion, like several others in this too evenly written book, is reported so routinely and
so far out of chronological context that its significance is largely obscured. See p. 1279
infra. Marcus does mention the union shop issue three times while describing the events
leading up to the seizure, but never in a way that suggests the issue's underlying signif-
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the performance of Assistant Attorney General Holmes Baldridge. An
antitrust lawyer, "he was unfamiliar with, and ill prepared to discuss,
the law concerning the pivotal issues in the steel seizure case."'35 He and
his colleagues submitted a hastily assembled brief that over-emphasized
the President's constitutional right to seize private property. According
to Marcus, this "critical error" encouraged the steel companies to
respond to that issue at length; it further led Baldridge, badgered by
Judge Pine, to make what one White House staff member called the
"legal blunder of the century"-the statement that the seizure was based
on "expediency backed by power."36 So outraged was the public by
this extravagant claim that even Truman was constrained to back
down-a little. He released a carefully phrased explanation of his posi-
tion and had Senator Hubert Humphrey announce that Baldridge's
argument was bad law. At the last moment Baldridge submitted a
disingenuous supplemental memorandum to the district court designed
to submerge the inherent powers question.
37
Indubitably, Marcus's strictures on Baldridge's oral performance are
warranted; the hapless Assistant Attorney General himself admitted
that he had made a terrible argument.-" But it is quite another thing to
charge, as Marcus does, that Baldridge's brief and oral argument were
primarily responsible for Judge Pine's decision to hear argument on
the merits. Marcus terms the earlier arguments on the motion for a
temporary restraining order before Judge Holtzoff a "microcosm" of
those before Pine.39 Industry attorneys raised the constitutional issue
briefly but forcefully at that time and Judge Holtzoff insisted, over
Baldridge's strong objections, that the Assistant Attorney General ad-
dress the constitutional question.40 Given this background, Baldridge
would have been remiss had he not discussed inherent powers as force-
fully as possible in the brief submitted to Judge Pine.
Conversely, Marcus's account of the hearing tends to spare Judge
Pine the harsh judgments she levels against Baldridge. The reader is
never told that Pine, a strict constructionist, seemed anxious to take the
35. P. 105.
36. Pp. 111, 124-25.
37. Pp. 125-26; see A. WEsTiN, supra note 5, at 67-68. This memorandum stated that
"'[a]t no time have we urged any view that the President possesses powers outside the
Constitution, and our brief.. . is clear on that point. On the contrary we have urged that
the President must act within the Constitution, specifically Article II .... .P. 206 n.89
(quoting Supplemental Memorandum of Defendant) (emphasis added).
38. P. 310 n.107.
39. P. 103.
40. See 1952 Doc., supra note 30, at 245, 254.
1278
Vol. 87: 1272, 1978
Steel Seizure
case. 4 ' Baldridge's well-founded complaint that the judge forced him
to focus on the constitutional question is relegated to a footnote.42 And
though Marcus does report that Pine cut off Baldridge's argument
about the propriety of equitable relief, she fails to point up the extra-
ordinary contrast between the judge's perfunctory treatment of that
important matter and his relentless interrogation of Baldridge on the
constitutional issue.43 Pine's conduct together with his impassioned
opinion-which has been flippantly, but accurately, characterized as
"more like a Liberty League tract than a realistic appraisal of the
duties and responsibilities of the President of the United States in an
era of permanent crisis" 44-should have guided the reader to the in-
escapable conclusion: Judge Pine conducted, in the guise of a hearing,
a badly flawed "trial" on the merits because he was predisposed to rule
on the merits, not because Baldridge led him astray.
Although the author sees much of this, she frequently fails to put
facts and analysis into a context that establishes their relative weight.
Not until the following chapter, for example, does she dutifully insert
a merciless dissection of Pine's comportment by Max Lerner. The
judge, wrote the New York Post columnist, "'ruled quickly, as though
he feared that if he allowed the government to improve its argument,
he might find himself without a thunderous decision, and the republic
might not need him as saviour.' ,,4" Marcus adds, in paraphrase, that
had "Pine waited until a hearing on the merits, the government would
have been given a chance to answer the complaint fully, a record would
have been established, and a judgment based on fact instead of rhetoric
would have been the result. '4 6 That, of course, is the point. But by the
time it is finally made, the impression that Baldridge shaped the course
of the hearing and that Pine acted within acceptable norms is too
firmly formed to be modified by what has the appearance of an after-
thought.
More serious still, Marcus fails to perceive the ironic relationship of
Judge Pine's conduct of the hearing to her central thesis: the rule of
law. If it was desirable that the seizure be judged ultimately on the
merits, it was imperative that the process by which the merits were
41. W. HARBAUGH, supra note 10, at 470. Marcus accurately terms Pine a "conservative"
with a "solid reputation." Pp. 108-09. She does not note that he served as confidential
clerk to James Clark McReynolds when McReynolds was Attorney General and that he
leaned toward McReynolds philosophically. See IV. HARBAUCH, supra note 10, at 470.
42. P. 305 n.81.
43. 1952 Doc., supra note 30, at 366-74.
44. Roche, supra note 23, at 613.
45. P. 132 (quoting N.Y. Post, Apr. 30, 1952, at 48).
46. Id.
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reached conform to normal procedure. The hasty disposition of Youngs-
town on all levels violated the maxim, recently restated by Charles L.
Black, Jr., that "[j]udicial judgment on great constitutional issues . . .
[should be] based on long and deeply informed reflection." 47 This
hasty disposition also precluded full examination of the overriding
evidentiary question: the supply of steel. Indeed, the day after Judge
Pine's ruling, the Wall Street Journal reported a two month's supply
of steel on hand. 48 The accuracy of this and similar reports was con-
firmed by the fifty-five day strike that followed the Supreme Court's
decision in June. As a National Production Authority study concluded,
the effects of the strike " 'were not too serious; the economy func-
tioned, [and] the defense program went forward.' ,4 Contrary to
Truman's Memoirs, moreover, the strike had little relation to a short-
age of heavy ammunition that summer.50
Cross-examination by attorneys with access to company records in a
full evidentiary hearing might have revealed the Government's exag-
geration of the impending crisis.51 The Supreme Court's perception of
the emergency (assuming that the case still would have reached that
tribunal) would then have been based on the record instead of on leaks,
rumors, and press reports. Meanwhile, an authoritative finding below
that the emergency was not immediate would have destroyed the
rationale for invoking the inherent powers argument, because the
Government could not have argued reasonably that the statutory al-
ternatives were too burdensome. This would have enabled the Court
to speak more effectively-and surely in fewer than seven voices-
on Truman's failure to resort to these alternatives. Yet the results in
Marcus's terms, and I confess in my own, would have been substantially
47. Black, A Constitutional Question, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1978, § 7 (Book Review), at 36.
48. Pp. 131-32 (citing Wall St. J., Apr. 30, 1952, at 8, col. 4).
49. P. 356 n.13 (quoting National Production Authority, Government Action in the
Steel Dispute 12 (Dec. 1, 1952)).
50. Id.
51. Thus Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett emphasized the effects of a "prolonged"
strike before warning also against one for "a short period of time." 1952 Doc., supra note
30, at 29, 31. Atomic Energy Commissioner Gordon Dean talked partly in terms of a
"protracted cessation" of production. Id. at 32 (emphasis added). And National Production
Authority Chairman Henry H. Fowler put the critical period at eight weeks. Secretary of
Defense Lovett and several other officials, at a meeting on the afternoon of the seizure,
expressed the opinion that Truman should invoke the Taft-Hartley Act. They did not
press their views on the President because they sensed that he had already made his
decision not to invoke the Act. G. MCCONNELL, supra note 5, at 35. Thus, despite their
warnings about the urgent need for steel, these officials were willing to tolerate a short
stoppage while the Taft-Hartley machinery was started. Marcus does not mention this
illuminating fact. Instead, she writes that "[i]n view of the military obligations of the
United States, this interruption, as the many affidavits filed by the government demon-
strated, would have been too costly." P. 123.
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the same: "the President, like every other citizen, is subject to the
law."112
Marcus's view that Youngstown was a "great case" rests partly on the
contention earlier noted that it influenced the Court to hear Brown v.
Board of Education, Baker v. Carr, and a succession of other important
cases . 3 This is thin ice, at least for the school segregation and appor-
tionment cases, and some of it is simply not skateable. There is not a
shred of evidence that Youngstown influenced the Court's decision to
take Brown,54 and the evidence on Youngstown's connection with
Baker v. Carr is only marginally better.55 Yet the ice did slowly thicken.
Lower court judges often cited Youngstown in Vietnam War cases, and
Douglas referred to it in several bitter dissents to denials of certiorari. 6
In DaCosta v. Laird, for example, Douglas wrote: "We did not defer in
the Steel Seizure Case, when the issue was presidential power, in time
of armed international conflict, to order the seizure of domestic steel
mills. Nor should we defer here, when the issue is presidential power
to seize, not steel, but people."' 7 Meanwhile, Chief Justice Earl Warren
cited Youngstown in declaring for the Court its right to rule on the
House of Representatives' refusal to seat Adam Clayton Powell.58
As the Nixon years advanced, writes Marcus, Youngstown became
an increasingly useful precedent because "the opinion of the Court
denied inherent power in the President and because the ruling struck
down a President's order." 59 Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in
the Pentagon Papers case rested strongly on Youngstown." In the
electronic surveillance case, the court of appeals invoked Youngstown
to deny that the President could go beyond authorized wiretapping
procedures.6 1 The Steel Seizure precedent also figured importantly in
52. P. 260.
53. Pp. 228-29. See p. 1273 supra.
54. See generally R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUscaE (1976) (epic work does not mention
Youngstown's influence). Marcus does not say directly that Youngstown influenced the
decision to take Brown. She writes, for example, that changes in the Court's member-
ship undoubtedly spurred its changed attitude. Yet she introduces Brown in a way that
virtually forces the reader to infer that the intent of the passage is to link the two
cases. Pp. 228-29.
55. P. 230. The sole support for the connection with Baker v. Carr is a passing mention
of Youngstown in a footnote to Douglas's concurring opinion. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 246 n.3 (1962).
56. Pp. 232-35. See, e.g., DaCosta v. Laird, 405 U.S. 979, 979-80 (1972) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting); Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886, 886-900 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
57. DaCosta v. Laird, 405 U.S. 979, 980 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
58. Powell v. Mccormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969).
59. Pp. 235-36.
60. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 742, 745-46 (1971) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
61. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 444 F.2d 651, 660-61, 665 (6th Cir. 1971),
aff'd, 407 U.S. 297 (1972). See pp. 236-38.
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the impoundment cases, 62 in Nixon's effort to dismantle the Office of
Economic Opportunity,63 and in the Watergate cases.0 4 Judge Sirica
relied heavily on Youngstown in the first of the Watergate cases, 5 and
the court of appeals termed Youngstown "the most celebrated instance
of the issuance of compulsory process against Executive officials" in
holding that Youngstown destroyed the notion that the President could
not be party to a SUit.60 Finally, in United States v. Nixon, Chief Jus-
tice Burger cited Youngstown as precedent for finding certain exercises
of executive authority unconstitutional and quoted at length from
Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Youngstown.
07
Constitutional scholars will surely refine, and probably sever, some
of Marcus's links. They will remark on her heavy reliance on dissents
and concurrences. Only in Powell v. McCormack and United States v.
Nixon did the opinion of the Court actually cite Youngstown. 3 They
will note that she gives equal emphasis to opinions on both sides of
the inherent powers issue. 9 And they will take sharp exception to her
treatment of the electronic surveillance case.70 The significant point in
that case is not that Justice Powell affirmed the judgment of the court
of appeals; it is that Powell himself nowhere mentioned Youngstown,
a fact that Marcus's page-long exegesis of Powell's opinion completely
ignores. Similarly she seems not to perceive that Powell sought to
underscore the inappositeness of Youngstown by twice stating that
the surveillance case required no judgment on the scope of the Pres-
ident's power with respect to the "activities of foreign powers, within
or without this country. ' 71
Nevertheless, there is no gainsaying Marcus's contention that the
Nixon era gave Youngstown viability and that the case helped create
62. See Sioux Valley Empire Elec. Ass'n, Inc. v. Butz, 367 F. Supp. 686, 697-98 (D.S.D.
1973).
63. See Local 2677, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60, 76-77
(D.D.C. 1973).
64. Pp. 238-48.
65. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Issued to Richard M. Nixon, 360 F. Supp.
1, aff'd sub nom. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (1973).
66. 487 F.2d at 709.
67. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974).
68. Marcus has Chief Justice Warren saying in Powell v. McCormack that Youngstown
"was the prime example" of the Court's assumption of constitutional responsibility for
settling separation of powers questions. P. 231. In fact, Warren did not cite Youngstown
as a "prime example" although he did cite it as support for the proposition. See 395 U.S.
at 549.
69. In discussing Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), for example, Marcus reports Justice
Black's sweeping repudiation, in dissent, of the inherent powers doctrine and Justice Gold-
berg's repudiation, in a separate dissent, of the doctrine "in time of peace" without com-
menting on the significance of the. distinction between the two dissents. Pp. 231-32.
70. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
71. 407 U.S. at 308, 321-22.
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a judicial climate that transcends measure by frequency of citation.72
As she reports in a passage that warrants greater emphasis than its
burial in a footnote suggests, attorneys in the Department of Justice's
Office of Legal Counsel "do not often cite the case, but it is always in
the back of their minds. ' 7 3 A recent ranking of the Steel Seizure case as
nineteenth of the "milestones" of American law by some fourteen
hundred respondents to an American Bar Association Journal poll is
further testimony to its general importance. 74 Nor is it likely that
Marcus's central conclusion will be seriously challenged. Youngstown,
she asserts, "dealt a telling blow to the... doctrine ... that each branch
of government was the arbiter of its own powers and responsibilities. ' 75
For all the strained quality of its linkage, and despite its deficiencies
of emphasis and thus of interpretation, the factual contribution of
Truman and the Steel Seizure Case makes it a useful addition to con-
stitutional history. It is reasonable to hope that its close account of the
economic and political aspects of the seizure, along with its demonstra-
tion of the linkage between Youngstown and several of the Nixon era
cases,," will stimulate among historians, political scientists, and law
professors the interest the episode richly deserves. As Paul Freund said,
the suit echoed "the ancient voices of Bracton and Coke proclaiming
that not even the King is above the law; and this principle is so greatly
to be cherished that perhaps its reassertion is never untimely."
77
72. P. 228.
73. P. 358 n.31 (reporting telephone interview in 1974 with then Deputy Assistant At-
torney General Leon Ulman, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice).
74. Letter from William M. Amundson, West Publishing Company, to author (Dec. 27,
1977) (copy on file with Yale Law Journal). Amundson estimates that about 10% of the
respondents were judges and perhaps 15% law professors. Telephone conversation with
William M. Amundson (Dec. 22, 1977) [notes on file with Yale Law Journal]. The first 18
choices are listed in J. LiEBERAN, MILMTONES vii (1976).
75. P. 248.
76. The Carter Administration's reaction to the prolonged coal strike of 1977-1978
graphically illustrates the deterrent force of Youngstown and subsequent cases. At no
time, reportedly, did the Administration consider seizure without specific authorization of
Congress.
77. Freund, supra note 4, at 89.
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Reform of Court Rule-Making Procedures. By Jack B. Weinstein.
Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977. Pp. xiv, 216. $12.00.
Reviewed by Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.t
The general subject of this gentle and well-documented little book
by Judge Jack B. Weinstein is the apparatus for drafting and promul-
gating that type of legislation known as "rules of court." The specific
agenda in Judge Weinstein's discussion comprises the two forms of such
apparatus that operate in the federal court system. One is the process
that provides us with the Federal Rules-the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and (with some mis-
carriage) the Federal Rules of Evidence. The other is the procedure for
making local federal rules.
The Federal Rules are officially the product of the Supreme Court,
acting in accordance with the Enabling Act of 1934, as amended. Under
that Act, the Supreme Court is empowered to "prescribe by general
rules, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the prac-
tice and procedure of the district courts and courts of appeals of the
United States in civil actions."' A parallel authority is conferred with
respect to criminal procedure. 2 In fact, however, the drafting of the
Federal Rules is the immediate responsibility of the Judicial Confer-
ence, which consists of the Chief Justice of the United States, the chief
judges of the courts of appeals, the Court of Claims, and the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, and some district judges. This has
evolved from a statutory duty imposed on the Judicial Conference to
advise the Supreme Court and to make recommendations based on a
continuous review of the Federal Rules.3 The Judicial Conference in
turn has a Standing Committee on Rules, and that Committee has
Advisory Committees on each of the principal sets of rules (Civil,
Criminal, Admiralty, etc.). The committees are made up of leading
federal judges, members of the bar, and law professors. Both the Stand-
t John A. Garver Professor of Law, Yale University.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1970).
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ing Committee and the Advisory Committees are authorized to retain
technical staff, the chiefs of which by convention have been law pro-
fessors of standing. The Enabling Act further requires that proposed
rules be presented to Congress for review before becoming effective, a
procedure that is not an empty formality, as proved by the congressional
revision of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The procedure for drafting
and promulgating the Federal Rules has therefore come to involve the
following sequence: professorial draft, Advisory Committee revision,
Standing Committee review, public dissemination of Tentative Draft,
further revision, presentation to the Supreme Court, presentation to
Congress.
The situation with regard to local rules is quite different. The power
to promulgate local rules is currently defined substantially the way it
was in 1793: "That it shall be lawful for the several courts of the United
States, from time to time, as occasion may require, to make rules...
to regulate the practice of the said courts respectively . . . ." That is
all there is to it. The scope and subject matter of local rules is a matter
of local judicial predilection, as is the procedure by which they are
drafted and promulgated. The only legal control currently imposed on
local rulemaking is the requirement that a rule be "consistent with
Acts of Congress and rules of practice and procedure prescribed by the
Supreme Court." 5 Even this limitation has proven not wholly effective.
For example, the six-person civil jury was introduced into the federal
system by a local rule that was apparently inconsistent not only with
both an Act of Congress and a Federal Rule but also with the Constitu-
tion.0
Judge Weinstein reviews this and other less famous instances of local
rulemaking. It brings to mind another instance with which I am
acquainted. Not long after Congress enacted the Federal Registration
of Judgments Act,7 Judge James Alger Fee of the United States District
Court for the District of Oregon promulgated a rule requiring that a
party seeking to register a judgment from another district make a
motion to have it registered. This motion procedure was not required
by the Registration of Judgments Act and indeed was inconsistent with
the purpose of the Act, which was to make a judgment of one district
4. Act of 1793, ch. 23, § 7, 1 Stat. 335. The current version, at 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1970 &
Supp. V 1975), reads: "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress
may from time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business."
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
6. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973) (upholding validity of such jury against all
three sources of attack).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1970).
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court enforceable in another by a simple clerical procedure. Why then
did Judge Fee proclaim a local rule requiring an apparently superfluous
procedure? There is no legislative history, because local rulemaking
does not require any legislative process, but the reliable gossip was that
Judge Fee believed the Registration of Judgments Act was unconstitu-
tional and wanted an opportunity to so hold.
Most of the local rules in the federal courts are neither so idiosyn-
cratic in substance nor so frivolous in purpose. But Judge Weinstein
convincingly demonstrates that they are at least uneven in these re-
spects. Taken as a whole, local rules can best be described as measure-
ments of the chancellors' feet.
The present procedures for local federal rulemaking are thus virtu-
ally the antithesis of those for making the Federal Rules. The Federal
Rules are initially drafted by lawyer-scholars who are both technically
expert and free of role conflicts concerning what the rules ought to be;
the local rules usually are written by the judges themselves. The Federal
Rules require the assent of diverse constituencies in the bench and bar;
most local rules are essentially judicial fiat. The Federal Rules are sub-
ject to both closed and open debate; the local rules rarely undergo any
debate at all. The Federal Rules must avoid offending the sense of
justice of the Supreme Court and of Congress, as well as that of the
Department of Justice; the local rules need be meet in the eyes of only
one set of beholders.
Not surprisingly, the conclusion drawn by Judge Weinstein is that
the procedure for local federal rulemaking ought to be revised. In this
context he makes reference to the proposals of the American Bar As-
sociation's Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration.8 The
modest injunction of these Standards is that in making rules of court
there should be "a procedure that involves opportunity on the part of
members of the public and the bar to suggest, review, and make recom-
mendations concerning proposed rules."9 Judge Weinstein would
further require that all local rules be effective only upon approval by
the Standing Committee on Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Confer-
ence. This would parallel the procedure by which the Federal Rules are
submitted to Congress before becoming effective, and thus seems
eminently sensible. Indeed the proposal is hardly debatable if one ac-
cepts even a minimal concept of legislative due process. I predict, how-
8. J. EINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 18 (1977) [hereinafter
cited by page number only].
9. ABA COMMISSION ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO
COURT ORGANIZATION § 1.31 (1973).
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ever, that many judges will exhibit substantial resistance to the idea,
perhaps because they do not really believe in law, the test of which is
willingness to subject one's own behavior to the constraint of rules.
Fortunately, the local rules are of considerably less practical con-
sequence than the Federal Rules. The latter, after all, are comprehen-
sive regulations of the adjudicative process in the federal courts. These
Rules have stood up remarkably well. The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure have been in effect for nearly forty years and the Rules of
Criminal Procedure for more than thirty. The rest have a much shorter
history but appear solidly established. Moreover, both the Civil and the
Criminal Rules have been widely emulated in the states, where the only
compulsion for their adoption is the persuasiveness of their worth.
Except for such fundamentally difficult questions as the proper scope
of discovery, the use of the class action, and post-judgment review of
criminal convictions, criticism of the Federal Rules is mostly esoteric.
Moreover, it can be said that current analysis of procedural due process
under the Constitution essentially involves deciding how far non-
judicial tribunals must go toward conforming to the judicial model as
prescribed in the Rules.
That is a fair political record for any body of legislation. It is a very
impressive one in an era that has seen an expansion of procedural jus-
tice and an unparalleled questioning of our institutions. The Rules
may be Bleak House, 10 but everyone seems to want to live there.
Why then is Judge Weinstein concerned not only about the pro-
cedure for making local rules but also about the procedure for making
the Federal Rules? I confess that after reading him carefully I do not
clearly understand the basis of his concern. The suggestions he makes
for reforming the Federal Rulemaking procedure are restrained to the
point of being exiguous. They are only these: (1) the period during
which proposed rules must repose in Congress before becoming effec-
tive should be extended from ninety days to six months;"' (2) Congress
should not redraft "details of the rules" but rather "should confine its
involvement to the review of substantial principles"; 12 and (3) the
authority under which the rules are promulgated should be the Judicial
Conference and not the Supreme Court. 13
The first of these proposals on its face is of such little consequence
that in reality it is of almost no consequence at all. Under the present
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procedure, no proposed Federal Rule has ever been presented to Con-
gress with less than a two-year public exposure. If Congress has had any
problem of oversight with respect to the Rules, it is not due to in-
adequate notice. Judge Weinstein's second suggestion is a comment
rather than a proposal; I will speak to it later in this discussion. His
final proposal is hardly of any greater moment than the first. If the
Federal Rules were not issued "by" the Supreme Court, but "by" the
Judicial Conference, the important question would be whether it
would make much difference and if so what kind. The arguments
advanced by Judge Weinstein suggest that it would not make much
difference.
In arguing for the change to the Judicial Conference, Judge Wein-
stein asserts that the members of the Supreme Court lack expertise in
the subject matter because they do not have much trial experience.
Compared to whom? The Chief Justice and Justices Marshall, Powell,
Rehnquist, and Stevens have had substantial personal experience in
litigation; Justice Brennan was a judge in both the trial court and
appellate division in New Jersey; and the other members of the present
Court have had the kind of experience in practice that well informs a
lawyer of what litigation is about. And, if they lack such experience, so
what? They have plenty of informants. Furthermore, expert practi-
tioners of the forensic art are not inevitably best qualified to fashion
the regulations that should govern it, as the infamous Hilary Rules
should always remind us. It is also argued that the Court lacks time to
give the Rules adequate attention. No doubt true, but again so what?
If the Court had a lot more time, I doubt that its members would ac-
complish much in revising proposed Rules. The argument most em-
phasized by Judge Weinstein is that the Court's imprimatur on the
Rules "inhibits the Supreme Court and other courts from impartially
construing the rules in accord with the Constitution, statutes, and ap-
propriate federal-state relationships."' 4 The suggestion here is that by
adopting the Rules the Court to some extent forecloses questions con-
cerning their validity, particularly in relation to the Erie doctrine. 15
The last of these arguments actually, if not formally, contradicts the
statement that the Court lacks the time to consider adequately the
Rules before their adoption. The Court surely cannot have a heavy
intellectual investment in material it has not studied. Apart from this,
14. P. 147.
15. Eric R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Specifically, the question is that con-
sidered in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965): whether a Federal Rule that makes an
"outcome difference" is a valid exercise of authority under the Enabling Act and the
Constitution.
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however, the significance of the Erie question-the constitutional valid-
ity of federal adjective law as an exercise of federal authority-seems
vastly inflated. To be sure, the question was raised insistently in Sib-
bach v. Wilson 9, Co.16 and in Hanna v. Plumer.17 But after Sibbach
the question seems to have survived chiefly because of its theoretical
interest to lawyers. Or are we to suppose that a rule varying the effect
of a local statute of limitations'8 should be regarded as an illicit in-
vasion of the domain of state law, while the same is not true of the
manifold procedural standards imposed on the states by the due process
clause?'
This is not to denigrate the Erie problem. I support its significance,
just as-to borrow a phrase from Thomas Reed Powell-its significance
supports me. But I have never thought that there was much to the Erie
problem in the domain of "process" and "practice" and "procedure,"
the terms used at various times to refer to the adjective law of the
federal courts. This does not mean there are no interesting and en-
gaging questions in locating the boundaries of "procedure," as the
problem of privileges in the Federal Rules of Evidence illustrates.
These questions, however, are not different in kind or degree of
significance from those arising out of rules such as the scope of "stand-
ing to sue ' 20 or abstention 2 1 or deference to pending state court pro-
ceedings22 or regulation of the internal affairs of state government
23-
rules that the Supreme Court must periodically reexamine even though
it is more closely involved in their formulation than it is in the draft-
ing of the Federal Rules.
More directly to the point of Judge Weinstein's suggestion that the
Supreme Court should not promulgate rules whose validity it must
subsequently assess, I wonder whether the legal position of the Federal
Rules would be any different if they were issued by the Judicial Con-
ference instead of the Supreme Court. If the principles governing the
validity of delegated legislation were observed 2 4 there would be a
16. 312 U.S. 1 (1940).
17. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
18. This was the problem in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
19. See, e.g., Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF.
L. REV. 929 (1965).
20. See Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV.
645 (1973).
21. See generally Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman
Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071 (1974).
22. See generally Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103 (1977).
23. See generally Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism
and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1977).
24. See, e.g., Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942).
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presumption of validity accompanying Rules issued by the Judicial
Conference at least as strong as any intimated for Rules promulgated
under present procedure. Rules as they are now developed-drafted by
academic technicians, approved by a committee of expert practitioners,
widely disseminated for comment, and submitted to Congress-represent
the product of a process markedly superior to that currently used to
develop delegated legislation of infinitely greater variety and com-
plexity, but entitled to a strong presumption of validity.2° Or should
the Supreme Court subject procedural rules to greater scrutiny than
administrative regulations because the Judicial Conference is an affili-
ated but subordinate judicial body, or because the rules deal with a
subject on which every judge has an expert opinion? That is politically
possible, of course, but legally incomprehensible. Moreover, consider
the problems that have actually arisen. Would the Court have given the
problem in Hanna v. Plumer2-' even the time of day if the regulation
had been one issued by the Social Security Administration and dealt
with distribution of unclaimed federal benefits?
This leads to a somewhat paradoxical conclusion: if the Supreme
Court were no longer even nominally the author of the Federal Rules,
its scrutiny of the Rules would probably be less than it is at present.
If so, the quality of the process by which the Rules are made, and not
merely the imprimatur under which they are issued, would become of
even greater concern than it has been in the past. On this score, Judge
Weinstein's analysis of the process as it now exists is generally an ap-
proving one, a conclusion that probably is shared by most people
familiar with procedural law.
Equally interesting in Judge Weinstein's analysis of the Rulemaking
process is what he does not argue. He does not argue that the Rules in
the federal courts should be written by Congress, or that the present
drafting procedure should be changed in any significant way. In this
respect he is only slightly more restrained than Professor Howard
Lesnick, who raised similar questions about Federal Rulemaking a
couple of years ago.27 It is my impression that Professor Lesnick's
orientation to the law and lawmaking processes in general is radically
critical. If that is so, one would expect from him a severe appraisal of
the present procedures for formulating the Federal Rules. Yet Professor
Lesnick comes down with only two specific proposals beyond those al-
25. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970) (rulemaking provisions of Administrative Procedure Act).
26. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
27. Lesnick, The Federal Rule-Making Process: A Time for Re-examination, 61 A.B.A.J.
579 (1975).
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ready mentioned. One is that there be wider "input" at the drafting
and revising stages of the Rulemaking process. The other is that the
Advisory Committees be less unrepresentative.
Professor Lesnick's proposals certainly are attractive-who could be
against more public "input" or more "representative" Advisory Com-
mittees? Yet I wonder whether these proposals are really very sub-
stantial. As for inadequate "input" from various sectors of the public,
the only specific instance cited by Professor Lesnick is the assertedly
inadequate consideration of the question of a newsperson's privilege .2
This is a single instance and one that does not suggest that greater input
would have changed the result. I doubt that the media people could
have gotten their act together sufficiently to state a proposal on this
subject; apparently most of them thought, probably rightly, that no
rule is better than any rule. And if, as some have claimed, it was of
dubious wisdom for the draftsmen of the Rules of Evidence to have
dealt with privileges as they did,29 what would one then say if the
draftsmen dealt with a newsperson's privilege? More generally, as Judge
Weinstein notes, the actual problem of "input" is not that the "public"
is denied an adequate opportunity to have its say, but rather that it does
not bother to use the abundant opportunity that exists. 30 This may
suggest that the "public," and indeed most of the bar, has very little
that is worth saying with regard to the Rules. That would be the
simplest inference to draw, and possibly the soundest. Is it unthink-
able?
Somewhat the same question suggests itself about the "representative-
ness" of the Advisory Committees. A committee on any subject as tech-
nical as procedural law must comprise people who at least can grasp the
subject matter. The Advisory Committees should therefore consist
mostly of lawyers. With this limitation, what theory of representation
is to be used? The tokenist formula-a woman, a black, a "spokesman
for the poor"-despite its wide usage is defensible neither morally nor
intellectually nor functionally. What is one's position "as a black" on
the problem of adequacy of representation in class suits3' or discovery
of documents?32 Perhaps what is intended by Professor Lesnick is that
the Committees include radical-activists in procedural jurisprudence (if
there are such), so that a wider spectrum of opinion is considered. But
28. Id. at 580 n.3.
29. See Weinstein, The Uniformity-Conformity Dilemma Facing Draftsmen of Federal
Rules of Evidence, 69 COLUM. L. REy. 353 (1969).
30. P. 10.
31. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
32. See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
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would that not result in the combination of paralysis and power
politics exemplified in the struggle over privileges in the drafting of
the Federal Rules of Evidence? Perhaps Professor Lesnick believes that
by broadening the range of participation the extension would be toward
the left, because the bench-bar "establishment" is indisputably con-
servative. I have doubts about this assumption, arising in part from
witnessing the example of Judge Weinstein, who is at least a guest
member of the establishment and who in matters of procedure is a
radical in the classic sense.
Perhaps, therefore, it would not be inappropriate to turn the question
of representation around: what proposals can anyone develop that were
not considered in drafting any of the Federal Rules but that would
have been considered by a differently composed set of Committees? In
this I mean proposals that would have an appreciable chance of passing
through the political gauntlet through which the Rules must move.
Judge Weinstein does not suggest any, nor does Professor Lesnick, nor
have I thought of any. (Of course, this may only prove that we share
the lack of imagination that must explain the conservatism of the
present Rulemaking structure.)
This leads to another point that Judge Weinstein helps illuminate:
the role of Congress in Rulemaking. Judge Weinstein reminds us that
of all the sets of Federal Rules, only those on evidence received sub-
stantial attention from Congress . The effect of this attention was
profound perturbation of the Rulemaking process and the superficial
repudiation of a carefully worked product. In substance, however, Con-
gress adopted intact the work of the Rules drafting procedure, with
these two exceptions: (1) the House Judiciary Committee made some
minor changes reflecting the thought of some of its lawyer-members,
and (2) the subject of privilege was simply avoided. Both actions reveal
important limitations in the congressional aspect of the Rulemaking
process.
The changes made by the House Judiciary Committee in the Federal
Rules of Evidence exemplify the disproportionate influence that lawyer-
legislators often have on procedural rules emanating from the legisla-
ture. The lawyer-legislators have influence as legislators because they
are in the legislature; they have influence as lawyers because they pre-
sent themselves to their fellow members in the legislature as profes-
sional experts in "lawyer's law," as the law of procedure may aptly be
classified. The lawyer-legislators cannot be drawn into technical debate
33. Pp. 71-75.
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by their professional peers, nor into debate over policy by their political
peers. In my own experience, moreover, lawyer-legislators occasionally
exhibit deep resentment at the superior professional stature of the
elite of the bar found on the drafting committees. As a result, they
sometimes allow themselves to legislate their professional grudges. In
a somewhat parallel fashion, the lawyer-legislators when confronted
with questions of procedure often project the opinions of that part of
the bar that is seldom in court and that therefore wants a system where
relative amateurs can maintain sway. This is an interest that deserves
some protection and is one to which Rules committees, being com-
posed of litigation specialists, are often inattentive. Yet on the whole
the amateur interest is given excessive weight when the legislature has
a strong, direct influence on the Rulemaking process. At any rate, it
seems fair to say that it is not the superior expertise of the judiciary
in such matters but rather these political circumstances that have been
the real impetus for removing procedural Rulemaking from the legisla-
ture.
Perhaps recognition of these political facts explains why Judge Wein-
stein does not argue for changing the role of Congress in the Rule-
making process. Instead, he warns that Congress should not redraft
details of the Rules and should confine itself to review of "substantial
principles." Such also seems the only explanation for the hopeful but
vacuous proposal that Professor Lesnick has put forth-that there be a
"meaningful mode of congressional review that does not undermine
the rule-making process itself."34
In this connection the treatment of the matter of privilege in the
Federal Rules of Evidence is worth special attention. What happened
in the congressional revision of the Rules of Evidence had little to do
with the Rule Committee's predilections and a great deal to do with
those of key members of Congress. Senator McClellan of the Senate
Judiciary Committee wanted to limit the scope of the criminal de-
fendant's privileges and expand the scope of the prosecutor's privileges.
Using his power as chairman of a pivotal subcommittee, the Senator
blocked the proposed Rules until he succeeded in exacting the changes
he thought needful. He accomplished this through backstairs negotia-
tions with the Department of Justice and apparently, through it, with
the Chief Justice. The product that resulted was then substituted for
the proposals drafted by the Advisory Committee. Moreover, no op-
portunity for comment on the Senator's revisions was afforded to in-
terested outsiders.
34. Lesnick, supra note 27, at 580.
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This maneuver has since been referred to by those who criticize the
Rulemaking procedure as being improperly cabined.35 That is fair
enough. But the further inference has been drawn that the Rulemaking
procedure is defective because "a small group of lawyers will make the
critical decisions and these decisions will simply be endorsed at higher
and higher levels, becoming law by inertia and by lack of effective
public and professional participation." 30 That is at best a tenuous
diagnosis. Presumably the remedy is more procedural democracy. But
if so, one will have to take the bad part of legislative democracy-as
exemplified in the logrolling over privileges-along with the good.
There are some who, thinking only of an idealized legislative process,
would abandon the present expert-dominated procedure. Judge Wein-
stein does not reach that conclusion. On the contrary, he accepts the
present Rulemaking procedure, subject only to the qualifications pre-
viously mentioned and to the suggestion that the documents flowing
into and out of the drafting process should be more freely available to
interested parties. As to the theory of political legitimacy that sustains
exercise of such important power by such a cloistered group, he simply
calls it "pragmatic."-"; Equally important, he does not suggest that the
procedure be materially changed from what it has been. He thus ap-
pears ready to accept what Professor Lesnick is reluctant to acknowledge
and what other commentators seem to find inadmissible: that a quite
undemocratic legislative process has proven capable of producing a very
satisfactory product. Correlatively, the archetype of institutionalized
democracy-the legislature-has mishandled the same work when it has
gotten into it.
Does this mean that professional elites may retain a legitimate place
in policymaking?
35. Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 175-76 (1973)
(statement of Charles R. Halpern and George T. Frampton, Jr.) ("Only a narrow
spectrum of the legal profession itself was involved [in drafting the Federal Rules of
Evidence], and even that segment had inadequate opportunity for scrutiny and com-
ment .... ")
36. Id. at 176.
37. P. 17.
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Talking about Taking*
Private Property and the Constitution. By Bruce A. Ackerman. New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977. Pp. ix, 303. $12.95
Reviewed by James E. Kriert and Gary T. Schwartz$
Private Property and the Constitution talks about the "taking"
problem-more precisely, about the different ways legal professionals
talk and think about the problem. Thus the book's text is far less
encompassing than its title. A broad range of constitutional property
subjects is virtually neglected.' A number of issues central to the tak-
ing problem itself-for example, the meaning of "public use" and the
measure of "just compensation" 2-are put aside as "peripheral." 3 We
are not, then, dealing with "an encyclopedic survey of compensation
law, ' 4 much less a definitive volume on the constitutional law of
property.5 The book focuses instead on a single, central problem
raised by the Constitution's langge: under what circumstances should
we say that property has been taken?G For better or worse, Professor
Ackerman reaches no answers to that question. His concerns are the
differing perspectives from which the taking problem is viewed and
the implications that follow from the choice of one perspective or
another.
* Professor Krier is grateful to the Environmental Quality Laboratory, California
Institute of Technology, for providing him with time to work on this review.
t Professor of Law, University of Calfiornia, Los Angeles.
t Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles.
1. There is little or no discussion of familiar questions about search and seizure or
procedural and substantive due process, much less of such grand questions as the ultimate
status of private property-and capitalism-in our constitutional system.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4 ("nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation").
3. B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 190 n.5 (1977) [hereinafter
cited by page number only]. A number of other issues, some of them very important ones,
are treated in the same fashion-mentioned but left unattended. See, e.g., pp. 31-32, 41,
59, 96.
4. P. 190 n.5.
5. It is clear, though, that Ackerman believes his discussion to be relevant to legal
analysis in general. See pp. 5, 168-75.
6. This problem has attracted the close attention of some of our best scholars, now in-
cluding Ackerman. See, e.g., Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Sax,
Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Sax, Takings and
the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
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Having noted the narrow topic treated in Private Property and the
Constitution, it would be misleading to leave unnoted the book's re-
markable subtlety and depth of analysis. Ackerman's is an elegant and
masterful work, marked throughout by intellectual dazzle and a lively,
graceful style. We shall begin with a critical description of its primary
aims and arguments, reserving more general assessment for the end
of this review.
I
The taking problem is a consequence of the activist state-a con-
sequence of particular concern since the advent of the environmental
revolution. As government goes about promoting a better environment,
not to mention many other good things, it inevitably harms some
people for the benefit of others. Are these harms takings of property
requiring payment of just compensation, or merely the unhappy, but
noncompensable, results of valid police-power regulations?
The Constitution's answer is, of course, obscure. Payment is due
when "property" is "taken," yet neither the Constitution's language,
its history,7 nor its judicial interpretation provides sure standards
for identifying just when that has happened. But, Ackerman argues,
lawyers can do more than rely on conventional constitutional analysis.
They can, and do, proceed on two divergent lines of inquiry, one lead-
ing to the conclusion that present taking doctrine is sensible, the other
finding only nonsense. The problem, then, is to choose "between two
fundamentally different ways of thinking about law." And that choice,
Ackerman asserts, is a philosophical, not a legal, matter. "Philosophy
decides cases; and hard philosophy at that."9 Thus his book is as much
about philosophy as law; one of its central concerns is "the proper
relationship" between the two.10
II
As a philosopher, Ackerman reveals a penchant for dualism. Two
principal dualisms, for example, form the centerpiece for his evalua-
tion of legal reasoning. The first contrasts competing approaches-
Ordinary and Scientific-to legal language.1" The Ordinary enthusiast
7. Ackerman's view is that the history is "unilhnminating." P. 7. For a strong argument
to the contrary, see F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANT,. THE TAKING ISSUE 51-138 (1973).
8. P. 4.
9. P. 5. "[A]nalysts must become philosophers if they wish to remain lawyers." Id.
10. Id.
11. A reader's guide to the dualisms in Private Property and the constitution would
note, in addition to Ordinary versus Scientific, the following: Observer versus Policymaker,
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looks for the fundamental sense of legal language in the everyday talk
of nonlawyers; he believes that "nonlegal ways of speaking can be ex-
pected to reveal the basic structure and animating concerns of legal
analysis."' 12 In the Scientific view, on the other hand, the essence
of legal language is "a set of technical concepts whose meanings are
set in relation to one another by clear definitions."1" What the lay
person might do with or make of the language is of little interest.14
Ackerman's second principal dualism deals with conflicting at-
titudes-Observing and Policymaking-about the objectives a legal sys-
tem should pursue. The Observer measures a legal rule by "the extent
to which it vindicates the practices and expectations embedded in, and
generated by, dominant social institutions." 15 He is interested in the
generally accepted social norms and in the rules that best support those
norms.' 6 In contrast, the Policymaker assesses legal rules by the extent
to which they conform to "a relatively small number of general prin-
ciples describing the abstract ideals which the legal system is under-
stood to further.' '1 7 These principles form a self-consistent whole that
Ackerman terms a Comprehensive View; the View provides the mea-
sure for legal rules'18
Although the Observer and the Policymaker are each impatient with
the other's starting point,19 the ultimate contest is not between them
any more than it is between Ordinary and Scientific analysts. Rather,
forces are likely to be joined such that the central conflict pits Scientific
Policymakers against Ordinary Observers.2 0 When presented with the
Utilitarian versus Kantian, social property versus legal property, and restrained versus
innovative judges (within the latter are more particular contrasts between deferential and
activist, conservative and reformist, and principled and pragmatic judges). The occasional
capitalization is Ackerman's. One might suppose that it is intended, Milne-like, to reify
his concepts and ideas, though Ackerman explicitly warns against "the fallacy of mis-
placed concreteness," p. 15, later called "reification," p. 27.
12. P. 10.
13. Pp. 10-11.
14. P. 11. The scientist's concepts "do not gain their warrant from ordinary con-
temporary discourse but from a specialist's claim that his particular methods"-whether of
anthropology, history, psychology, or sociology-"will generate superior insight." P. 18.
15. P. 12.
16. Id.
17. P. 11 (footnotes omitted).
18. Id.
19. They are impatient but not necessarily at complete odds. The Policymaker asserts
that there must be a governing Comprehensive View; the Observer concedes that there
may be. If society were, in fact, organized around a distinct Comprehensive View, the
Observer would accept it as the standard for social norms, simply because society had. Pp.
12-13.
20. These are not, of course, the only possible alliances, but Ackerman argues that they
are the only plausible ones. Thus Scientific Observers and Ordinary Policymakers are put
aside. See pp. 16-20. We, however, shall return to them. See pp. 1315, 1316-17 infra.
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Constitution's ambiguous instructions on the taking problem, the first
resorts to a highly technical (Scientific) examination of the problem's
essential structure in order to lay bare the competing considerations
that must be reconciled in accord with the Comprehensive View
(Policymaking).2 1 The second relies on common (Ordinary) under-
standing to reveal the nature of the problem and on social expectations
to suggest its resolution (Observing).2 2 The contending forces thus put
the problem differently and are likely in many cases to reach different
results.23
III
The confrontation sketched above is only the major battle. Scientists
might differ on which technical language or discipline offers the
greatest insight; more important, Policymakers may disagree widely
about Comprehensive View. And two judges who otherwise stand on
common ground might nevertheless diverge on judicial role.2 4 The
nature of these conflicts becomes apparent through an examination of
the Scientific Policymaker.
A
We noted above that Scientists might disagree about language, but
Ackerman believes that this is unlikely in the particular case of "prop-
erty." Although there are "many Scientific languages that may be pro-
posed... for the analysis of legal problems,"25 such as the vocabulary
of law and economics, 26 or of McDougal and Lasswell,2 7 or of Hoh-
feld,28 at least as to property there is a clear consensus. "Instead of de-
fining the relationship between a person and 'his' things, property law
discusses the relationships that arise between people with respect to
things.... Each resource user is conceived as holding a bundle of rights
21. P. 15.
22. Id.
23. P. 9. Lawyers and judges, Ackerman believes, move effortlessly between Ordinary
Observing and Scientific Policymaking. Pp. 9-10. Nevertheless, he sees the bulk of present
case law as reflecting an Ordinary Observer's mentality. See pp. 1307-10 infra.
24. P. 25.
25. P. 26.
26. E.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977).
27. E.g., M. MCDOUGAL, H. LAssWELL 9- I. VLAsic, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE
(1963).
28. E.g., Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Rea-
soning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913), reprinted in W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONcEPTIONS
23 (1919).
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vis-ht-vis other potential users ... .-'29 According to Ackerman, it follows
for the Scientist that whenever the state removes any right from one
user's bundle and puts it in that of another, a constitutional taking has
occurred prima facie. It does not follow, however, that payment is
necessarily due. The Constitution forbids takings only if they occur
"without just compensation." For Ackerman this "suggests that pay-
ment is constitutionally required only when it will serve the purposes
of justice."30
This is a quirky and somewhat troublesome interpretation of the
constitutional language. A straightforward reading of the Fifth Amend-
ment surely suggests that "just" is the measure of "compensation," not
the determinant of a taking.31 And it would be odd for Ackerman's
Scientist, having conceived a highly refined and unOrdinary explication
of "property," then to give such an Ordinary meaning to "taking." To
be sure, Ackerman's peculiar interpretation leads easily into "the im-
plications of the very abstract idea of just compensation in [a] wide
variety of disputes."3 2 Notice, however, that his approach necessarily
means that the Scientific Policymaker is to work the problem out solely
in terms of justice, for compensation must be paid only when justice
demands. On the other hand, the more typical (and compelling) line-
that which separates the deprivation from the taking--admits of resolu-
tions based on efficiency, and thus accommodates more comfortably
than does his own interpretation Ackerman's later analysis of the
taking problem in Utilitarian terms.33
29. P. 26 (emphasis in original).
Notice that Ackerman's source for a Scientific language of property is the way law-
trained people discuss the subject. Elsewhere he suggests that Scientific inspiration might
be drawn from any number of disciplines. See note 14 supra. Had he investigated these
other fields, however, he might have discovered more disagreement about technical
language. Some economists, to be sure, define property as Ackerman suggests-relationships
between people about things. See, e.g., Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, in
Papers and Proceedings of the 79th Annual Meeting of the American Economic Associa-
tion, 57 Am. EcON. REy., May 1967, at 347, 347. Others seem to think of property as a
relationship between a person and a thing. See Kohr, Property and Freedom, in PROPERTY
IN A HUMAINE ECONOMY 47, 49 (S. Blumenfeld ed. 1974). Legal philosophers can diverge
along these same lines. Compare I J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 137-38 (Boston
1840) with Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 373 (1954). For
some reason, however, Ackerman has cast the lawyer as the paradigmatic Scientist. In any
event, we are not convinced that the "consensus" of which Ackerman speaks actually exists,
even among lawyers-let alone among "the dimmest law student[s]," p. 26.
30. P. 28 (emphasis in original).
31. The Fifth Amendment permits deprivations of property if accompanied by "due
process of law," but takings must be accompanied by "just compensation." U.S. CONsr.
amend. V, cls. 3, 4. The problem is to distinguish between a deprivation and a taking,
rather than to differentiate one taking from another.
32. Pp. 28-29.
33. See pp. 41-70. One could argue that Utilitarianism-at least as originally conceived-
was the prescription for a just society. But Ackerman seems to have in mind not
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B
Scientific Policymaking judges, even if they agree on language, might
still differ widely on judicial role and Comprehensive View.34 As to
the first, bear in mind that judges enter the taking drama after numer-
ous governmental actors have already denied the erstwhile owner his
claims for just compensation. Whether the judge is inclined to defer
to those earlier decisions or to make an independent judgment will
depend on whether he is, in Ackerman's terms, restrained or innova-
tive.35
If a judge reviews the decisions of other legal actors as if those deci-
sions were the products of a perfectly functioning legal system, that is,
a system operating in strict conformance with the Comprehensive
View, then that judge is perfectly restrained. He never finds reasons to
overturn challenged decisions; he never even feels it necessary to look.36
Judges are unlikely, however, to be perfectly restrained. Ackerman
finds a model of realistic restraint in Rawls's image of a "well-ordered
society," one whose basic structure and general performance conform
to the Comprehensive View, despite occasional error.37 The realistically
restrained judge assumes the responsibility to correct the government's
occasional errors in implementing the Comprehensive View. But he
claims no right "to fashion legal doctrine for the purpose of leading
society down the road to Utopia. This aspiration can, by definition,
never be indulged by the judge who acts as if he were already in a
well-ordered society." 38
In contrast, the innovative judge believes it proper to consider not
simply whether others have erred but also to inquire whether society is
indeed well-ordered. He acknowledges that society may be funda-
"Bentham's Utility" but "Posner's Efficiency." P. 11. (We say this with some hesitation;
despite his scolding others for confusing the two concepts, see p. 278 n.28, Ackerman
himself is not perfectly clear. See, e.g., pp. 42, 213 n.36.) Few would claim efficiency to be
the first word (much less the last) on justice. But see R. POSNER, supra note 26, at 189-91.
34. Much of Ackerman's book is about judges-it is an ambitious and inventive effort
to describe what judges do-but surely it is not written for them as a primary audience.
The book does not pretend to tell judges how to do their job. Moreover, it is written in
a code (e.g., "Posner's Efficiency," p. 11; "the Carolene Products footnote," p. 50) that may
not be easily accessible to many.
35. Pp. 34-39. Ackerman's role models largely ignore the limited competence of courts
to acquire knowledge of relevant facts and to develop and administer flexible remedies.
See Michelman, supra note 6, at 1215 n.100, 1248-56. Michelman's point is merely noted
at pp. 208 n.16, 255 n.62.
36. This might be because he believes the system perfect, but it is enough if he believes
that correcting imperfections is the responsibility of other governmental branches.
37. P. 35; J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JusTcE 4-5, 453-62 (1971).
38. P. 36 (emphasis in original).
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mentally out of agreement with the Comprehensive View and assumes
an obligation to improve the situation as necessary.
39
C
We have now only to consider the Comprehensive View, for in dis-
cussing it we can sketch Ackerman's vision of how Scientific Policy-
making judges will deal with the taking problem. Unlike the choice of
a judicial role, choice of a Comprehensive View is not a matter of taste
or predilection. 40 The View that the judge is to "impute" to society
is the one that has been "adopted by the legal system." 41 But Ackerman
offers no solution to the puzzle of exactly what criteria should be used
to recognize the prevailing Comprehensive View.42 He finds, however,
that lawyers "willing to talk like Policymakers" limit themselves to
two distinct Views: the Utilitarian and the Kantian.
43
Ackerman begins his analysis of the Utilitarian View by considering
the position of the generally restrained judge. 44 Committed to maxi-
mizing social satisfaction, the Utilitarian judge is especially concerned
to avoid the costs that might attend a governmental reshuffling of
39. Ackerman renders his abstract notions of restraint and innovation more concrete
by contrasting judicial responses to three propositions about a well-ordered society. Pp.
37-39. The first proposition is that the existing property distribution is generally con-
sistent with the Comprehensive View. The restrained judge assumes an appropriate dis-
tribution; he is a conservative. The innovator instead adopts the reformist's skepticism.
The second proposition is that government generally acts in a way consistent with the
Comprehensive View. The restrained (deferential) judge assumes such actions while the
innovative (activist) judge does not. The last proposition is that citizens accept the Com-
prehensive View and tolerate governmental decisions that they believe accord with the
View but happen to work to their disadvantage. The restrained (principled) judge assumes
that society is made up of such "good losers" and has no patience with those who carp
about the burdens of a well-ordered society. The innovator (pragmatist), on the other
hand, will consider overturning an error-free decision that has disaffected a group that
rejects the Comprehensive View.
Ackerman claims that he takes "no particular joy in this proliferation of labels." P. 38.
Perhaps so, but he clearly takes intellectual pleasure in building the models that make
the labels necessary.
40. Ackerman provides no normative guidelines for the choice of judicial role, thereby
suggesting that it is simply a matter of personal preference.
41. Pp. 11-12, 182, 283 nA6.
42. P. 41. The choice of Comprehensive View is critical. The View offers the Policy-
maker's only clear guide to when government must pay for a taking; choice of language
and of judicial role are secondary. If Ackerman's purpose were to advise us how to dis-
tinguish meritorious claims, then his failure to devise "rules of recognition," p. 41, for a
Comprehensive View would be devastating. His aims, however, are much more limited.
See p. 1295 supra.
43. P. 42. Ackerman uses the more general terms "efficiency" and "fairness" as ap-
parent synonyms for the Utilitarian and Kantian Views. See, e.g., pp. 42, 77, 269 n.116.
44. Pp. 44-49.
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property rights. Two costs will be of particular interest.45 The first is
the cost of General Uncertainty: governmental activity might increase
the risks of property ownership and thereby impose costs on risk-
averse citizens. The second is the cost of Citizen Disaffection: the
demoralization cost borne by View-adhering citizens who believe them-
selves the victims of one of the well-ordered society's occasional errors.40
Neither large uncertainty costs (U) nor large demoralization costs (D)
will necessarily suggest to the restrained Utilitarian judge that com-
pensation is due. He will go on to compare the sum U + D with the
process costs (P) involved in requiring compensation-the transaction
costs of determining who deserves payment and in what amounts. If the
costs of making compensation would be higher than the costs that com-
pensation would avoid, then to require compensation would make
society, on balance, worse off.47
45. This argument builds on Michelman, supra note 6. Ackerman acknowledges Michel-
man's contributions at p. 49.
46. Pp. 44-47. See p. 1300 supra. The disaffected citizen's claim of error need not
be well founded in order to interest the restrained Utilitarian judge, so long as it is
sincerely believed. See note 39 supra. But the more the judge considers a decision to have
been sound in Utilitarian terms, the less likely he is to regard a claim of error as
sincerely advanced. See pp. 47-48.
47. Pp. 45-49. The compensation payment itself is ignored in this formulation be-
cause that payment merely involves a redistribution from one sector of society to another.
Redistribution between the government and landowners may, however, raise a question
of fairness. Ackerman's Utilitarian Policymaker is oblivious to all (non-Utilitarian) fairness
concerns, even though scholars Ackerman considers to be Utilitarians, see pp. 49-50, 209
n.22, would insist that the takings clause contains an inevitable fairness dimension. See
Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 165, 167-69 (1974);
Michelman, supra note 6, at 1218-24; Sax, Takings and the Police Power, supra note 6,
at 57, 60, 64-65. All of this suggests to us the artificiality of the pure Utilitarian Policy-
maker.
Readers familiar with the Michelman article, supra note 6, on which Ackerman builds
will note a number of similarities and differences in the two analyses. Michelman addresses
the issue whether the taking decision being litigated should simply be invalidated without
regard to compensation. It should be if the benefits of the transferred rights in their new
use'(B) are less than the total costs-the sum of the value of the rights to pretransfer hold-
ers (C) plus the smaller of P or U + D. Once the project passes this test, the compensation
question turns, as for Ackerman, on whether P is larger or smaller than U + D. Acker-
man's analysis, as sketched thus far, treats only the issue of whether compensation is due.
Later, however, he considers the invalidation issue and resolves it in the same fashion as
Michelman. See p. 224 n.13. He also asserts, however, that in a certain sense compensation
will always follow where U + D is larger than P. If B > C + P, the project will go forth
with compensation; if B < C + P, the project will be invalidated and the complaining
party's property rights will be returned. Id. See note 55 infra. But the two situations are
different. If the project is invalidated, the complaining party gets back his rights together
with any subjective value he may attach to them over and above fair market value (con-
sumer surplus). If the project goes forth with compensation, on the other hand, he suffers
the involuntary transfer and, since compensation is measured in terms of fair market
value, he may lose consumer surplus. Either result, of course, might be quite demoralizing.
These observations suggest some troubling points about the meaning of demoralization
cost in the taking context. Presumably demoralization arises from having one's property
taken without compensation, not from suffering an involuntary transfer or a loss of con-
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Having laid this restrained groundwork, Ackerman proceeds to
consider what happens when an element of judicial innovation is in-
troduced. 48 We leave his discussion unattended not because it is unin-
teresting-hardly-but because it would fail to profit from our efforts
to summarize. Perhaps it is enough simply to note that the labels
"restraint" and "innovation" should not be taken, in Ackerman's
scheme, to mean "generally against" and "generally in favor of" com-
pensation, respectively. The restrained Utilitarian judge-notwithstand-
ing his inclination toward deference-might insist on compensation in
many instances where the innovator would not.
49
D
The Kantian is a Scientific Policymaker and thus shares both the
Utilitarian's faith in a Scientific language50 and his commitment to a
Comprehensive View. The major difference is that the Kantian View
insists that individuals have rights not to be sacrificed to Utility; peo-
ple are not to be exploited as means to some grand end.51
sumer surplus when compensation is paid. Otherwise, the concept says nothing about
whether compensation is due. But the demoralization costs of an involuntary transfer or
loss of consumer surplus raise the very real possibility that a project approved-even on
the condition that compensation be paid-because it will increase social satisfaction will
in fact do just the opposite. This possibility suggests to us that the Michelman-Ackerman
analysis of demoralization cost is incomplete and that the measure of compensation is
more important than their inattention to it implies.
48. Pp. 49-64. See note 39 supra.
49. This much is clear from Ackerman's discussion, but other matters are not. Tastes
as to judicial role might reflect a number of combinations of restrained and innovative
elements. P. 204 n.8; see notes 39 & 40 supra. It is not clear how one predicts the behavior
of a judge whose tastes as to one element-say he is an activist-incline him to require
compensation while his tastes as to other elements-say he is a reformist pragmatist-incline
him to deny it. This ambiguity is especially troubling given Ackerman's belief "that the
weight of constitutional opinion on judicial role has its center of gravity at neither of the
polar extremes" (pure restraint nor pure innovation). P. 44. Despite such problems, the
discussion of judicial role stands as a rich and provocative contribution.
50. Ackerman assumes that Kantians and Utilitarians share faith in the same Scien-
tific language. Although we agree that Utilitarians generally manipulate the bundle-of-
rights language he attributes to them, it is not clear that Kantians do. The Kantian con-
cern with exploitation might attract them to the notion that property refers to a relation-
ship between a person and his things. See, e.g., R. NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA
57-58 (1974) (notion of boundary crossings); Kohr, supra note 29, at 49. Our skepticism is
further aroused when we note that Bentham himself used something very much like
person-and-his-things language. See I J. BENTHAM, supra note 29, at 137-38.
51. Ackerman does not claim to apply the details of Kant's philosophy; rather, Kant's
name is chosen as a "symbol" of the fundamental non-Utilitarian principle of respect for
people as "ends in themselves." Pp. 71-72. Ackerman's Kantian View is largely inventive;
we know of no compensation commentary that adopts what Ackerman calls the Kantian
perspective. Michelman did discuss fairness, but according to Ackerman that discussion
was Rawlsian, not Kantian, extended Rawls too drastically, and "has turned out to be a
dead-end." P. 227 n.33.
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As with the Utilitarian, Ackerman begins his account of the Kantian
View by considering the restrained judge.5 2 The Kantian judge is not
satisfied simply to learn that some governmental decision has increased
net utility by transferring rights from one group to another whose
members value them more; the first group, after all, has been exploited.
If the judge believes, however, that the net gains from the transfer
exceed the process costs of fully compensating the first group, then by
requiring compensation he can avoid the exploitation that would other-
wise result. This leaves group two better off, and group one no worse
off, than before the transfer. '53 No one has been made the means to
anyone else's end.54 If, on the other hand, the judge believes that
process costs exceed net gains, he faces a quandary. If he requires com-
pensation, group two will be worse off than before the transfer, but if
he decides not to compensate group one, its members will be worse off.
This is a Kantian dilemma, for it appears that the judge must decide
who is to be the means to whose end. Ackerman argues that in this
situation the restrained Kantian will defer to the other branches of
government and permit the transfer without compensation. In contrast,
the Utilitarian would compare P, U, and D, with compensation de-
pending on the numbers. 55
52. Pp. 72-76. And as with the Utilitarian, he then goes on to consider what happens
when a taste for innovation is introduced. Pp. 77-83.
53. Ackerman's analysis leads him to a rather ironic tie between "Kantian juris-
prudence" and the economic concept of Pareto-superiority (denoting transfers that make
someone better off and no one worse off). See p. 222 n.l1. Observe, however, that taxpayers
probably will be footing the compensation bill. If taxpayers in general are not the
beneficiaries of the property rights transfer, then they will have been exploited for the
sake of groups one and two. The idea of Kantian exploitation of the general taxpaying
public seems somewhat bizarre, however, and calls the whole notion of exploitation into
question. Ackerman appears to be aware of some dimensions of the problem. See p. 222
n.12.
54. Compare the Kantian and Utilitarian approaches. The restrained Kantian will
require compensation whenever the benefits of a project (B) less its costs (C) are larger
than P. See note 47 supra. The Utilitarian will do so only if, in addition, P is smaller than
U + D, for if it is larger, there is more utility in not compensating. A Utilitarian judge
will be inclined to require compensation where P is very low, whereas the Kantian will
tend to compensate so long as P is not terribly high. P. 74. The Utilitarian's inclination
will result in some exploitation; the Kantian's will let some utility escape.
55. The Kantian, then, will sometimes require compensation where the Utilitarian will
not, and vice versa. The Kantian, Ackerman asserts, will insist on compensation only if he
believes that B - C > P, see note 54 supra; the Utilitarian will do so whenever U + D
> P, although the Utilitarian's "compensation" will be by invalidation of the transfer in
those situations in which P > B - C, see note 47 supra. The same will hold where
P> U + D> B - C.
Ackerman's conclusions here seem incorrect in two respects: (I) in concluding that a
restrained Kantian will never require compensation where P > B - C; and (2) in conclud-
ing that in such cases there is a dilemma with no unique Kantian solution. See pp. 75-76.
Simply assume, as does Ackerman, see note 47 supra, that invalidation is a kind of com-
pensation because it returns rights to those who held them prior to transfer. If P > B - G
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Whatever the differences between them, Scientific Kantianism and
Scientific Utilitarianism stand together in their rejection of the mode
of analysis revealed in conventional taking doctrine. Indeed, any
plausible Policymaking approach finds little more than nonsense in
the conventional treatment. Is the conventional mode senseless, or
merely different-with its own coherence? Ackerman believes the latter,
for reasons that should be clear from a brief look at that master of
convention, the Ordinary Observer.
IV
The Ordinary Observer thinks about law the way ordinary people
do; since regular folks do not reflect by some technical means upon
the larger relationships between the legal system and one or another
View, neither will he. Quite to the contrary, the Ordinary Observer has
an affirmative commitment "to the notion that law should support
dominant social expectations as these are expressed in ordinary lan-
guage." 56
A
Despite differences among the ways in which they speak, Ackerman
believes one can abstract "Uniformities" from the varying talk of
regular, well-socialized people.57 In "Ordinary property talk," a thing
is a person's "property" when the "owner" can, without disapproval or
sanction, use the thing in many more ways than can other people, and
when other people need some compelling reason (or the owner's per-
simply because C > B (rights, that is, have been transferred to a group that values them
less than the original holders), then the Kantian should "compensate" by invalidating the
transfer, which would leave no one worse off than prior to the transfer (Ackerman's point
of reference in all his examples). Thus there will be "compensation" even though P
(which may be zero) > B - C, and the "compensation" (by invalidation) provides a unique
Kantian solution to Ackerman's Kantian dilemma.
To summarize Ackerman's observations and our additions, a restrained Utilitarian will
compensate where U + D > P; he will invalidate where U + D > P > B - C, or where
P > U + D > B - C, or where C > B. A restrained Kantian will compensate where B -
C > P; he will, presumably, invalidate where C > B, and thus where P > B - C. Note that
if our analysis is correct, the restrained Kantian would never permit a project to go forth
without compensationl This suggests to us that Ackerman's analysis of Kantian exploitation
needs further elaboration. See, in addition, note 53 supra.
56. P. 94. See pp. 1296-98 supra.
57. See pp. 97-100. The regular, well-socialized people happen to be well-socialized
members of the middle class. Thus there is an assumption that society's dominant expecta-
tions are middle class, a proposition that cannot be tested without settling on the criteria
by which to recognize dominance. Ackerman chooses to "tiptoe around" this "master
question." P. 96. Recall the similar treatment of Comprehensive View, discussed at p.
1301 supra.
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mission) to use the owner's thing without disapproval or sanction. A
well-socialized owner recognizes, however, that he cannot do just any-
thing (something very harmful to others, for example) with his prop-
erty; moreover, in exceptional cases (an emergency, for example) other
people might be free to use his property even though it is still his and
not theirs.
Given this conception, we can picture how the Ordinary Observer
sees the taking problem. A person has some thing regarded by all as
his-it is "property" that he "owns." Then the government either
destroys or reduces the value of the property or transfers it to itself or
someone else, thereby changing the relationship between the person
and his thing. The erstwhile owner claims in court that compensation
is due. The Ordinary Observing judge will consider the worth of that
claim in the following way: is it fair to say that the government has, in
the circumstances, taken the owner's property?38 If the answer is "no,"
then there has been no compensable taking. An affirmative answer,
however, only makes a prima facie case for the claimant, since well-
socialized owners recognize that they cannot use their property in
ways unduly harmful to others. If the government has merely pre-
vented the claimant from using his thing in an unduly harmful way-
from creating a nuisance, for example-then denying compensation
would hardly be improper.59
B
The Observer, like the Policymaker, will acknowledge that he is not
to decide cases on the basis of personal predilection. The difference is
that the Observer's objective is legal rules that serve dominant expecta-
tions, while the Policymaker wants rules that serve the prevailing Com-
prehensive View. Ordinary Observing will seem to the Scientific Policy-
maker an illegitimate effort to protect the status quo without regard
to its "larger normative sense." Scientific Policymaking will suggest to
the Ordinary Observer an unjustified fascination with abstract prin-
ciples unrelated "to the existing structure of social life."60
Ackerman goes on to sketch briefly the Ordinary variants of judicial
restraint and innovation. To get the sense of his analysis one need only
refer to the treatment of these points in the Scientific Policymaking
58. P. 101. We take "fair" here to mean "proper" as opposed to "just."
59. P. 102.
60. Pp. 105-06. Of course, if a single Comprehensive View is in fact so entrenched that
it dictates dominant expectations, the Observer and the Policymaker will, but for dif-
ferences in language, apply the same rules. See note 19 supra.
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context, 61 and substitute "dominant expectations" wherever "Com-
prehensive View" appears. Ackerman himself feels it unnecessary to
trace how variations in judicial role would change the shape of doc-
trine, and we are happy to mimic him in this regard. Suffice it to say
that present taking doctrine reflects the product of Ordinary Observing
judges who are generally restrained. 2
C
Legal scholars have long been interested in "explaining" or "ra-
tionalizing" lines of cases, in demonstrating the larger sense that un-
derlies a surface of doctrinal chaos. Thus far Ackerman hardly has in-
dulged the old tradition: Scientific Policymaking simply does not
characterize present taking doctrine-however much, perhaps, it
should. 3 Ordinary Observing, however, is another matter. Using it as
an organizing concept, Ackerman can rationalize present case law.
Ackerman's illumination of conventional taking doctrine is rich and
persuasive. It represents in our judgment the most successful and con-
vincing account to date of the fundamental sense-that is, the coherence
and consistency-of the apparently senseless. 6 This hardly means that
Ordinary Observing so neatly organizes all the cases that the proper
resolution of every one stands out clearly. Quite to the contrary, "hard"
cases remain precisely because the methodology of Ordinary Ob-
serving-as opposed to that of Scientific Policymaking-lacks sufficient
power to resolve them. It is a point on the side of Ordinary Observing
as a legal reality, however, that its hard cases are in fact those of
present law.0 5
The analysis of Ordinary Observing relies on a distinction between
$'social property" and "legal property." Social property refers to those
things well-socialized people recognize as the owner's property; legal
property means those things that an owner can claim as his only on
61. See pp. 1300-01 & note 39 supra.
62. That is, these judges are principled (everyone's expectations are assumed to con-
form to the dominant norm), conservative (the existing distribution of property rights is
assumed to be consistent with dominant expectations), and generally deferential (the other
branches are assumed to understand dominant expectations at least as well as courts do).
Cf. note 39 supra (judicial role alternatives for Policymakers). At least one of the judicial
role alternatives-reformism-seems incoherent in the Observer setting. See p. 234 n.18.
63. See, e.g., pp. 85-87. But see Michelman, supra note 6, at 1224-45 (conventional
doctrine reflects much of what Ackerman would call Scientific Policymaking). Ackerman
notes his disagreement with Michelman's observations at p. 69.
64. This is not to say that Ackerman prefers the Ordinary Observing approach. See p.
113. He does succeed, however, in showing that conventional doctrine has its own rhyme
and reason; his rationalization works.
65. Pp. 115-16.
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the basis of legal advice. Since the Ordinary Observer's concern is to
support common understandings and practices, social property will
receive more solicitude than legal property.6
Regarding social property, Ackerman can demonstrate that applica-
tion of Ordinary Observing concepts to a variety of governmental inter-
ferences with property ownership leads to conclusions that match those
actually reached by the majority of American courts. Thus, govern-
mental action that literally takes an owner's property and transfers it
to another or destroys it will result in compensation, whereas govern-
mental action that simply limits the use (and thus the value) of the
property generally will not-even though the monetary loss to the
owner is the same in each case. In the first instance the owner's thing is
no longer his in any Ordinary understanding, whereas in the second it
quite clearly is. Both of the foregoing cases are easy for an Ordinary
Observer, as they usually are for conventional judges.67 They might or
might not be easy for a Scientific Policymaker. We can say with
confidence, though, that a Scientific Policymaker would approach the
two cases in a manner very unlike that of the Ordinary Observer. A
Policymaker would tend to treat the two cases in the same way, while
the Observer will treat each in a different way.6s
Ackerman's analysis of Ordinary Observing rationalizes very neatly
the line of cases denying compensation when the government is merely
66. Pp. 116-18. The distinction between social and legal property must be a dynamic
one. Once a series of professional opinions and judicial holdings becomes ingrained in
dominant social practices, property previously legal becomes social. See p. 237 n.15. Some
of the things Ackerman regards as legal property might in fact deserve the status of social
property. If they do, then the Ordinary Observing rationalization of present taking cases
becomes to that extent less convincing. We do not have the data to judge just how
sophisticated present Ordinary understandings are.
67. Pp. 124-26. Suppose, however, that social property is neither taken away literally
nor utterly destroyed, but that governmental action has rendered it virtually useless. This
poses a very hard case for the Observer. The owner still has his thing, but to say this is
really just a "bad joke," since the owner cannot in any substantial sense use what is
"his." See pp. 136-45. Here judicial role becomes important: a restrained (deferential)
judge, see note 62 supra, for example, will be impressed that no literal taking has occurred,
and will be mindful that other governmental actors have denied the owner's compensation
claim; an innovator (activist) will look closely for subtle clues about what dominant ex-
pectations might say about the case. If the common expectation is that owners can use
their things, and this owner cannot, it is as though his property has been taken or
destroyed. The activist might look not to how much the property's market value has
declined, but to how much it is still worth in absolute terms. For if it is still worth quite
a bit in absolute terms, then it may still be meaningful to say that the owner has a thing
of some advantage to him. In this way Ackerman makes sense of cases that deny compensa-
tion where the value of property is reduced by $80 million (from $100 million to $20
million), yet grant it where the reduction is $80 (from $100 to $20), even though the first
loss is magnitudes larger and the percentage diminution in the two cases the same. See
pp. 141-45. Needless to say, a Scientific Policymaker would find this very odd indeed.
68. See pp. 125-26.
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controlling "nuisances." 69 It also makes clear why certain hard cases-
such as those involving behavior that is perfectly well socialized at one
time but less so later-are difficult. The classic example, of course, is
the brickworks established in a rural setting but later surrounded by
residential development. The difficulty arises because denying com-
pensation in essence asks an owner to foresee more than any ordinary
person would, whereas granting it may appear to condone unduly
harmful conduct.
Ackerman anticipates another class of hard cases arising with regard
to conduct that is unduly harmful, not to other people, but to the
environment.7 0 He finds it revealing, given old patterns of socialization,
that efforts to defend envfionmental regulations have typically relied
on the human interests at stake. With the new emphasis on the need to
protect the environment for its own sake, however, he ventures the
opinion that Ordinary Observing judges may come more and more to
accept the protection of nature as part of the dominant social practices.
Or they may, on the other hand, find it so difficult to reach any judg-
ment about dominant practices in this context that they will feel forced
to adopt a Policymaking approach to compensation issues raised by en-
vironmental regulation .
1
This brings us to a final point. In suggesting that environmental
problems may lead Ordinary Observers to pursue Scientific Policy-
making, Ackerman notes that "if there is a Scientific revolution in the
making, it is only to be expected that the first signs should manifest
themselves.., where Ordinary conceptions of justification are most in
flux."172 The remark applies as well to the Ordinary Observer's ability
to deal with problems of legal property. 73 Recall that legal property,
unlike the social property we have thus far discussed, finds its status in
professional opinion rather than social practices. It has to do with
ambiguous conceptions of air rights and subsurface rights as opposed
to surface rights, with present and future interests in estates as opposed
to the good old fee simple. Legal property, in short, is defined by tech-
69. See pp. 150-55.
70. See pp. 155-56.
71. Thus Ackerman can note the irony that "a movement that seeks to restore Nature
to its proper place may well serve as one of the catalyzing events that inaugurates the
triumph of Artifice in legal thought." P. 156.
Ackerman raises in several places the possibility of an eclectic approach whereby the
Ordinary Observer resorts to Scientific Policymaking, but only after the Observer con-
cludes that his usual mode of analysis yields no coherent result. See, e.g., pp. 110-12, 155-
56, 163, 267 n.105. Such an approach could result in invalidation of a law on Scientific
Policymaking grounds. See note 47 supra. He does not discuss when, if ever, a pure
Ordinary Observer would invalidate.
72. P. 156.
73. See pp. 118-23, 156-67.
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nical legal rules rather than by common practices and understandings.
It is not difficult to see that some alleged takings of legal property will
cause Ordinary Observers (though not Scientific Policymakers) unusual
difficulty. This is because the prime mover of an Ordinary Observer's
urge to compensate, his interest in advancing expectations of the social
reality, has been weakened in the extreme in the legal property case.
But legal property is becoming more and more common, even though
laymen still depend on professional advice to understand it. If the
judge facing this trend chooses "simply [to] reserve the takings clause
to social property only," and thus denies compensation, he is "con-
signing the new property ... to constitutional limbo." 74 If, on the other
hand, he chooses to protect legal property (because, for example, its
owner has a "thing" like a piece of paper, a title, to point to), then he
is abandoning his fundamental methodological premises.7 5 How then
can a pure Ordinary Observing judge reach a reasoned and constitu-
tionally sound decision? In Ackerman's view, he cannot, and this is
one consideration in favor of Scientific Policymaking.
70
V
Thus far we have been preoccupied with a rather long, critical
description of Private Property and the Constitution, one we con-
sidered justified by the book's richness, methodological novelty, and
complexity. The work requires careful study, and we hope that what
we have said thus far will encourage and assist just that.77 The book's
main points, however, should be clear enough by now. The legal cul-
ture is suffering from a "prevailing schizophrenia."78 There is a "sub-
terranean conflict" between Ordinary Observing and Scientific Policy-
making as modes of legal thought-one that "expresses itself on the
surface of professional life by the common perception that takings law
is incoherent, its principles altogether mysterious. ' 7 The conflict is
one of the "master issues"80 that places the law at a dramatic "moment
74. P. 166.
75. He might approach legal property problems as a Scientific Policymaker, see note
71 supra, or he might indulge the fiction that legal property is social property. Either
involves an abandonment of the Ordinary Observer's methods. P. 163.
76. See pp. 166-67.
77. Our description is, of course, not complete. Ackerman's own effort to summarize
some of the high points of his book suggests that even he cannot do it full justice in a
brief span. See Ackerman, The Jurisprudence of Just Compensation, 7 ENVT'L L. 509 (1977).




Vol. 87: 1295, 1978
Taking
of reappraisal-of rediscovery and creation." 8 1 An understanding of the
conflict provides us with "the key"' 2 to the taking problem's mysteries,
and "almost everything depends"83 on how the conflict is resolved .
4
These claims represent Ackerman's main conclusions; their logical
foundation is his structure of basic concepts-Ordinary, Scientific, Ob-
serving, and Policymaking. The Utilitarian, Kantian, and judicial role
concepts are essentially superstructure and have little to do with the
central conflict Ackerman depicts. As we saw in tracing its application
to the taking problem, the structure (and superstructure) of concepts is
imposing and valuable: it orders diverse ideas and provokes numerous
insights. In our judgment, however, it does not support Ackerman's
main claims, which begin to appear excessive as soon as one examines
the concepts beneath them with a skeptical eye. The concepts, on close
scrutiny, become ambiguous and problematic in ways suggesting that
Ordinary Observing and Scientific Policymaking are not nearly so
irreconcilable as Ackerman asserts. Ironically, however, the contribu-
tions of his book remain in our opinion largely intact.
A
Ackerman's depiction of Ordinary versus Scientific is a near mirror
image of a larger conflict, one that has existed among philosophers
since the 1930s.85 One philosophical school (Ackerman would call it
the Scientific) is associated with early Wittgenstein and the logical
empiricists. It urged philosophers to adopt "an ideal, artificial language
in which concepts are precisely defined and propositions unambiguous-
ly" expressed.86 The competing school, developed around the later
Wittgenstein and the work of such philosophers as Moore and Austin,
has insisted that "ordinary language" should be the basic subject of
philosophical inquiry. This focus has been justified in various ways.




84. Professor Epstein reads Ackerman as holding that Ordinary Observing is at a
"dead end" and that Scientific Policymaking offers "salvation." Epstein, Book Review, 30
STAN. L. REV. 635, 639-40 (1978). We take Ackerman's discussion at face value, as quite
deliberately leaving the choice between the two an open question. Ackerman does, though,
occasionally intimate his own personal preference for Policymaking. See p. 113.
85. The historical development of the conflict is nicely described in Chappell, Introduc-
tion to ORDINARY LANGUAGE I (V. Chappell ed. 1964). This and some of the other works
to which we refer below are cited by Ackerman. No doubt he is aware of the philosophical
debate that we discuss, but we do not recall that he describes it.
86. J. KATz, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 69 (1966).
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dissolve a number of traditional philosophical problems by revealing
that they merely result from confusion in the uses of language.8 7 Others
advance a more affirmative case and argue that ordinary language
should be considered because of the fundamental wisdom it is believed
to contain. "[O]rdinary language," as Austin put it, "embodies . . . the
inherited experience and acumen of many generations of men."88
Ackerman's Scientific and Ordinary alternatives can be seen, then, as
a creative effort to import a longstanding philosophical debate into
legal and constitutional studies.8 9 Philosophers are likely to regard it
not merely as a rewarding application of the basic philosophical con-
cepts but also as a significant elaboration of the concepts themselves.
Thus, Ackerman's chapter on "Layman's Things"-on the way common
people talk and think about their "property" and its being "taken"-
could become, as has Austin's famous essay on "excuses," one of the
little classics of the Ordinary genre.90 Similarly, Ackerman's discussion
of the complex relationship between diversity and uniformity in the
patterns of everyday talk may involve an advance in the philosophical
literature.9'
In other ways, however, the discussion of Ordinary versus Scientific
language is not so satisfying. It is not entirely clear why a legal analyst
should even consider resorting to Ordinary language. Ackerman does
not take the negative position that fundamental constitutional ques-
tions can be dissolved by careful study of everyday talk; such a claim
would not be credible. If, then, Ackerman is relying on the affirmative
case for Ordinary language, it is important to ask just how sophisticated
and discriminating that language is. Is it, for example, sufficiently rich
and subtle to capture mankind's "inherited experience"? Here, of
course, there is enormous room for disagreement. 92 Just who are the
"ordinary persons" who utter "ordinary language"? At times they are
the "natives, ' 9 3 in which case the brief for Ordinary language involves
87. See, e.g., id. at 75-76.
88. J. AUSTIN, A Plea for Excuses, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 123, 133 (1961). The relevant
paragraph from Austin is cited by Ackerman at p. 285 n.50.
89. For a briefer attempt by one of us to use this philosophical distinction, see Schwartz,
The Logic of Home Rule and the Private Law Exception, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 671, 673-74
(1973).
That a choice exists between common and "scientific" legal language was suggested in
the early 19th century by Savigny, as he reflected on the codification movement. See
F. SAVIGNY, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE 27-30 (A.
Hayward trans. London 1831).
90. We refer to Ackerman's Chapter 6 and to J. AUSTIN, supra note 88.
91. See pp. 97-99.
92. Is the talk we hear the incisive commentary of the man on the street, see, e.g., S.
TERKEL, WoRKING (1972), or is it the confused "gibberish," see p. 170, of the masses?
93. Pp. 93-94, 170. Cf. Ryle, Ordinary Language, 62 PHILOSOPHICAL REV. 167, 167 (1953)
("Everyman").
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an appeal to rough folk wisdom. At other times Ordinary people are
the "(enlightened) 'middle-classes,' "9 who presumably speak a more
respectable tongue. Without further elaboration of the fundamental
sense of common talk, the suggestion that Ordinary language can
provide the proper resolution of legal problems is appealing but in-
complete. To be sure, Ackerman's Ordinary analysis makes sense of
conventional taking doctrine; we congratulated him for that very in-
teresting achievement. That achievement alone, however, does not
establish that Ordinary language (or Ordinary doctrine) is appropriate
or preferable as an approach to lawmaking.
The merits of the Ordinary versus Scientific debate are taken up by
Ackerman, though not at great length, in the final chapter of his book.95
He points out that the Scientific approach is unfortunate insofar as it
deprives citizens of the opportunity to understand the legal doctrines
that affect their lives.90 That the accessibility of law is a major value in
any democratic society is an important point, though not, of course, an
original one . The value of accessibility, however, clearly is not ab-
solute; the law must sometimes become technical to reach appropriate
results. Moreover, it is doubtful that a reasonable Ordinary judge
would be as unremitting as Ackerman's discussion suggests. Consider,
for example, Austin's position. "Certainly ... ordinary language is not
the last word: in principle it can everywhere be supplemented and im-
proved upon and superseded. Only remember, it is the first word." 98
Austin's willingness to permit the Scientific supplementation and even
supersession of original Ordinary findings seems to us an attitude that
any temperate Ordinary analyst would share.99 And this goes a long way
toward reducing the all-out conflict between the Ordinary and Scien-
tific approaches that Ackerman depicts. 100
94. P. 230 n.8.
95. See pp. 168-89.
96. See pp. 176-77.
97. See, e.g., D. MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAw 422 (1963).
98. J. AurriN, supra note 88, at 133 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted), quoted
at p. 285 n.50.
99. Contrast Ackerman's Ordinary Observing judge, who would tolerate the Scientific
Policymaking approach only when Ordinary Observing yielded intractably ambiguous or
incoherent results. See pp. 110-12.
100. Michelman's scholarship, see F. MICHELMAN & T. SANDALOW, GOVERNMENT IN
URBAN AREAS xiii (1970); Michelman, supra note 6, embodies an Austin-like position.
Starting with judicial opinions as data about how real judges react to legal problems, he
meditates upon and amplifies the case law in a highly theoretical (and Scientific) way.
There will be Scientists, of course, who will reject the Austinian accommodation for the
priority it places on conventional thinking and the possibility that it will stifle creativity.
See, e.g., E. GELLNER, WORDS AND THINGS 195-96, 263-65 (1959). Without more knowledge of
the adequacy of the stock of existing Ordinary ideas and the chances of profundity in
genuinely new ideas, this criticism is difficult to evaluate but impossible to ignore.
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Ackerman's Policymaker and Observer categories are also problem-
atic. The Policymaker turns out to be a puzzling hybrid of normative
and positive. He clearly has a normative dimension-as the very title
"Policymaker" suggests. Not only does he approve of the procedure of
explaining legal rules in terms of a Comprehensive View, but he finds
such legal rules "proper"'' 1 and his Comprehensive View evidently
deserving of "worship."'1 2 Thus, the friend of the downtrodden who
views the legal system as an elaborate, systematic expression of capital-
istic values 13 apparently does not rank as a Policymaker, despite his
professed recognition of a pervasive Comprehensive View. Yet since this
analyst is plainly not an Ordinary Observer, Ackerman's categories do
not clarify his status.
Despite this normative element, the Policymaker is also strongly
positive: the Comprehensive View he takes into account is supposed to
be the one he finds prevailing out there in the legal system, rather than
the one of which he may personally approve. Consider, then, the
analyst who has made up his mind about a proper Comprehensive View
(say he is a socialist or a monarchist), but has no clear idea as to what
the legal system's governing principles in fact are, except that they are
not his. This fellow cannot be a Policymaker, but he is also very un-
likely to proceed as an Observer. As important as his type is, for him
too there is no place in Ackerman's universe. 04 Or consider those
economists who claim that all of the common law can be understood in
terms of economic efficiency, but who also suggest that the legislative
process is driven by a different engine. 10 Since the legislature is clearly
an integral part of the legal system,' 00 such economists cannot be com-
pleat Policymakers, although Ackerman appears to consider them so.
1
'7
As a positive analyst, the Policymaker must be able to "impute"' 08 a
101. P. 11.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., M. HoRwiTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977).
104. When a judge is attempting to interpret some ambiguous legal rule, he will in-
quire about the basic principles that inform that rule and will presumably accept those
principles whether or not he personally agrees with them. For such judges-and the
scholars assisting them-the positive requirement may make sense. In such situations, the
judge or scholar is concerned with only a particular rule, however, or perhaps the sector
of the law that that rule inhabits. It is the rare scholar who is ambitious enough to at-
tempt to identify the Comprehensive View underlying, say, the entire First or Fourth
Amendment, much less the entire Constitution or the entire legal system. Yet it is pre-
cisely this last, systemic Comprehensive View that Ackerman asks us to contemplate.
105. See R. POSNER, supra note 26, at 404-05.
106. See p. 11.
107. See, e.g., id.
108. Id.
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Comprehensive View to the entire legal system, according to the proper
"rule of recognition." 109 Ackerman's failure to set forth the rule or to
explain in any way the process of imputation prevents us from fully
understanding the positive dimension of the Policymaker's role.
The stringent requirements of a unitary, pervasive, and obligatory
Comprehensive View threaten the coherence of the Policymaker cate-
gory. Early in his book, Ackerman considers the possibility of "Ordinary
Policymaking" and rejects it.11° "[N]o modern society has institu-
tionalized any single Comprehensive View"; instead, societies contain
coexisting "institutional clusters," each of them organized around its
own special "principles.""' But if this observation eliminates the
Ordinary Policymaker, what room does it leave for his Scientific coun-
terpart? Ackerman tries to make space by distinguishing between the
"social practices" that concern the Ordinary Observer and the "legal
system" that is the Scientific Policymaker's concern."12 He does not tell
us how he draws the line, nor why the legal system should not likewise
contain diverse "institutional clusters." If it does, any perceptive
analyst must conclude that there are several "Comprehensive Views"
prevailing in society. He is then at best a "quasi-Policymaker"; the
likelihood of such a modified status dilutes the strength of the Policy-
maker category.
Ackerman's strong statement of the Policymaker's position thus
strikes us as difficult to accept. His "Observer" category is likewise not
free of problems. The Observer, remember, regards the basic function
of the legal system as the fulfillment of expectations generated by
dominant social institutions. Ackerman appears to assume that these
institutions and expectations are exogenous to the law.113 But this basic
assumption is obviously incorrect. In any number of ways the law
creates or at least contributes to the social institutions that generate
expectations. The law influences emerging social practices and values
at the same time it reflects existing ones." 4 Once this is recognized, the
pure Observer's position becomes somewhat untenable. So long as the
109. Pp. 41-42.
110. See pp. 19-20.
111. P. 13.
112. Pp. 13-14 (emphasis omitted).
113. See pp. 12-14.
114. Consider universities, or labor unions, or marriage. In addition, Ackerman ap-
parently assumes that all Ordinary expectations are based on "dominant institutional
practice." P. 15. Others would say that expectations are also derived from shared com-
munity values that are not necessarily the products of any institution. And here again, the
law plays a fostering role. See Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal
Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9 (1977) (citing E.
DuRKHEIis, THE DIVISION Or LABOR IN Sociry (1933)).
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law is at least partly responsible for common expectations, it follows
that even the expectation-oriented analyst cannot escape the question
of what the law should be. If our analyst does attempt escape, the effort
will serve only to reinforce the status quo, whatever it may be."15 Thus
Ackerman's pure Observer reflects a severely conservative philosophy
that few in the American tradition would be willing to endorse.116
If the pure Observer's position is not perfectly viable, neither is it
altogether independent of the position that a Policymaker would likely
take. There are few judges or legal scholars, no matter how theoretical
their interests, who would dispute the idea that responding to valid
expectations is one of the important obligations of a legal system.
Ackerman regards this proposition as "almost self-evident" in the
Ordinary Observing context, 117 but it is not less so in any other. Con-
sider, for example, Michelman's concept of "demoralization costs,"
upon which Ackerman draws in his development of Utilitarian Policy-
making.1 8 According to Michelman, if the failure to afford compensa-
tion "demoralizes" a property owner by undermining his "expecta-
tions," there results a disutility that any welfare-utilitarian calculus
should take into account. This reasoning effectively brings social ex-
pectations into the Policymaking picture.1' 9
C
Our doubts about the credibility of Ackerman's typology are en-
hanced by considering its application to major legal scholars; after all,
a working test of a system of classification is whether it is effective or
illuminating as a classifier. Ackerman does not identify a single prom-
inent legal scholar who is clearly an Ordinary Observer, and we can
115. Cf. E. GELLNF.R, supra note 100, at 106-07, 157-58, 195-96, 223-25 (criticizing
ordinary language philosophy for implicit endorsement of status quo). See Ackerman's
mention of this problem at pp. 105, 179.
116. See pp. 105, 178-81. Ackerman's chapter on "Layman's Things" is quite successful
in explaining existing taking doctrine. Does our noting the conservative partiality of the
Observer approach suggest then that existing doctrine is suspect? Possibly so; this is a
concern that Ackerman recognizes. P. 105. Ackerman also suggests that the takings clause
bears an inherent conservative bias. Pp. 60, 114. If so, then the match-up of the takings
clause and the Observer perspective may not be inappropriate after all.
117. P. 179.
118. See p. 1302 supra.
119. Moreover, taking account of the inherent unreliability and unverifiability of
demoralization claims, Michelman concludes that only those that are "justified" in the
sense that they would be asserted by "ordinarily cognizant and sensitive members of
society" merit attention. Michelman, supra note 6, at 1213, 1215-16. This refinement of
the Policymaker's demoralization cost concept brings it even closer to the central concerns
of the Ordinary Observer.
1316
Vol. 87: 1295, 1978
Taking
think of none.120 As for Scientific Policymakers, Ackerman sees Pro-
fessors Posner, Dworkin, McDougal, and Rawls all as members of this
class; disagreements among them are merely "within the family."'
2'1
Yet apart from their ties to strong universities, we doubt that they or
others would recognize this family status. Our colleague Professor
Fletcher is referred to both as a Scientific Kantian and as an anti-
Scientific traditionalist. 22 This confusion is not, we think, accidental.
We agree that Fletcher relies on the moral idea that Ackerman describes
as Kantian. That idea is, however, rather simple in its basic outline; it
does not require ambitious Scientific language for its expression. Thus
scholars like Fletcher can be Policymaking Kantians and yet remain at
least somewhat Ordinary in their language selection.
It appears, then, that Ackerman's basic concepts, taken as pure types,
do not really hold up. We saw that Ordinary language advocates are
willing to entertain Scientific proposals, while Scientists are not en-
tirely hostile to certain Ordinary values. Observing alone cannot be a
sufficient approach to legal problems; happily, however, the Policy-
maker (confusing as his position can be) seems hospitable to some of
the Observer's concerns. If these remarks are accurate, then the striking
conflict on which Ackerman insists does not really exist. 123 The two
modes of Ordinary Observing and Scientific Policymaking can instead
be recognized simply as different but not mutually exclusive styles of
legal analysis. 2 4 As such they are quite capable of being blended by
lawyers and judges in any number of stable and satisfactory ways. In the
real legal world, scholars and judges are already choosing their blends




120. Ackerman refers to Professor Epstein not as an Ordinary Observer but rather as a
traditional anti-Scientist. Pp. 170, 275 n.14 . Since Epstein's early articles rely on the power
of simple statements like "A caused B harm," Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 151, 166 (1973), he can perhaps be regarded as Ordinary. But both the im-
plications he draws from such statements and the processes by which he draws them do
not seem at all like Observing. See, e.g., id. at 174-89. In his provocative review of the
Ackerman book, Epstein comes close to supporting Ordinary Observing-but only on
condition that the Observer be subjected to a considerable education, one with an evident
Kantian orientation. See Epstein, supra note 84, at 646-47, 656.
121. P. 15.
122. Pp. 170, 275 n.14, 279 n.33.
123. Note that Michelman, a model of Ackerman's Scientific Policymaker, is ultimately
able to conclude that the seemingly Ordinary Observing case law does make sense after
all-and in Scientific Policymaking terms. See note 63 supra.
124. Ackerman occasionally talks about judicial "eclecticism," but the opportunities for
an eclectic approach are considered to be very limited. See pp. 183-84, 267 n.105; note 71
supra.
125. Likewise, we suspect they are blending Utilitarian and fairness (or Kantian) con-
cerns acceptably. Ackerman's pure Utilitarian seems artificial, see note 47 supra, and his
pure Kantian, taken far enough, tends to run aground. See notes 53 & 55 supra.
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This is not to say, however, that Ackerman's efforts to clarify the
different styles of legal analysis have not been worthwhile. Quite to the
contrary, the understanding and amplification that he achieves repre-
sent contributions of the very first rank. There can be no question that
a greater sensitivity to distinct styles will further legal expression and
analysis.126 We should not, however, put ourselves in the position of
having to choose one style over another.12 The resolution of most legal
problems will call for a little Ordinary Observing and a little Scientific
Policymaking, a bit of Utilitarianism and a bit of Kantianism. -12 1
Despite our observations, Ackerman's book is a marked success in
two rather ironic ways. First, in recent years a highly theoretical brand
of legal scholarship has threatened to drive out or discredit not only
traditional doctrinal analysis, but also normative efforts that rely on a
commonsense approach rather than some elaborate conceptual frame-
work. It is to Ackerman's great credit that his discussion of Ordinary
Observing has revived the commonsense tradition-has, indeed, given
it a new rigor and vitality. The irony is not that Ackerman may not
have intended this; it is that he achieved it with such a formidable
structure of concepts. The second irony is that, despite his failure in
our view to carry his major claims, Ackerman has helped to demystify
the taking problem. Equipped with his rich bag of insights, future
analysts should be able to see light where before they saw only darkness.
126. But an excessive sensitivity can be disabling. As Ryle said in discussing the obses-
sion of some philosophers with language studies, "[w]e run, as a rule, worse, not better, if
we think a lot about our feet." Ryle, supra note 93, at 185.
127. Contra, p. 4: "My thesis, then, is this: In order to decide whether compensation
law is basically sound or ripe for sweeping change it is necessary first to choose between
two fundamentally different ways of thinking about law .... "
128. Ackerman admits of, and apparently endorses, a very limited sort of Kantian-
Utilitarian eclecticism-one in which Utilitarianism is resorted to only when Kantianism
fails to yield a clear result. See note 71 supra. For his brief discussion, see pp. 76, 85 &
225 nn.17-19.
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